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1. INTRODUCTION
We must reason and act in an uncertain world. There may be uncertainty about
the state of the world, uncertainty about the effects of our actions, and uncertainty
about other agents’ actions. The standard approach to modeling uncertainty is
probability theory. In recent years, researchers, motivated by varying concerns in-
cluding a dissatisfaction with some of the axioms of probability and a desire to
represent information more qualitatively, have introduced a number of general-
izations and alternatives to probability, such as Dempster-Shafer belief functions
[Shafer 1976] and possibility theory [Dubois and Prade 1990]. Our aim here is to
introduce what is perhaps the most general approach possible, which uses what we
call plausibility measures. A plausibility measure associates with a set a plausibility,
which is just an element in a partially ordered space. The only property that we
impose is that the plausibility of a set be at least as large as the plausibility of any
of its subsets. Every systematic approach for dealing with uncertainty that we are
aware of can be viewed as a plausibility measure. Given how little structure we have
imposed on plausibility measures, this is perhaps not surprising. Nevertheless, as
we hope to demonstrate in this and other papers, plausibility measures provide us
with a natural setting in which to examine various approaches to reasoning about
uncertainty.
The focus of this paper is (propositional) default reasoning. There have been
many approaches to default reasoning proposed in the literature (see [Ginsberg
1987; Gabbay et al. 1993] for overviews). The recent literature has been guided by
a collection of axioms that have been called the KLM properties (since they were
discussed by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [1990]), and many of the recent ap-
proaches to default reasoning, including preferential structures [Kraus et al. 1990;
Shoham 1987], ǫ-semantics [Adams 1975; Geffner 1992b; Pearl 1989], possibilistic
structures [Dubois and Prade 1991], and κ-rankings [Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992;
Spohn 1988], have been shown to be characterized by these properties. This has
been viewed as somewhat surprising, since these approaches seem to capture quite
different intuitions. As Pearl [1989] said of the equivalence between ǫ-semantics and
preferential structures, “It is remarkable that two totally different interpretations
of defaults yield identical sets of conclusions and identical sets of reasoning machin-
ery.” As we shall show in this paper, plausibility measures help us understand why
this should be so.
In fact, we show much more. All of these approaches can be understood as giving
semantics to defaults by considering a class P of structures (preferential structures,
possibilistic structures, etc.). A default d is then said to follow from a knowledge
base ∆ of defaults if all structures in P that satisfy ∆ also satisfy d. We define a
notion of qualitative plausibility measure, and show that the KLM properties are
sound in a plausibility structure if and only if it is qualitative. Moreover, as long as
a class P of plausibility structures satisfies a minimal richness condition, we show
that the KLM properties will completely characterize default reasoning in P . We
then show that when we map preferential structures (or possibilistic structures or
any of the other structures considered in the literature on defaults) into plausibility
structures, we get a class of qualitative structures that is easily seen to satisfy
the richness condition. This explains why the KLM axioms characterize default
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reasoning in all these frameworks. Far from being surprising that the KLM axioms
are complete in all these cases, it is almost inevitable.
The KLM properties have been viewed as the “conservative core” of default
reasoning [Pearl 1989], and much recent effort has been devoted to finding principled
methods of going beyond KLM. Our result suggests that it will be difficult to find
an interesting approach that gives semantics to defaults with respect to a collection
P of structures and goes beyond beyond KLM. This result thus provides added
insight into and justification for approaches such as those of [Bacchus et al. 1993;
Geffner 1992a; Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992; Goldszmidt et al. 1993; Lehmann and
Magidor 1992; Pearl 1990] that, roughly speaking, say d follows from ∆ if d is true
in a particular structure P∆ ∈ P that satisfies ∆ (rather than requiring that d be
true in all structures in P that satisfy ∆).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce plausibility mea-
sures and show how they generalize various other proposals for capturing uncer-
tainty. In Section 3, we review the KLM properties and various approaches to
default reasoning that are characterized by these properties. In Section 4, we show
how the various notions of default reasoning considered in the literature can all
be viewed as instances of plausibility measures. In Section 5, we prove our main
results: we define qualitative plausibility structures, show that the KLM proper-
ties are sound in a structure if and only if it is qualitative, and provide a weak
richness condition that is necessary and sufficient for them to be complete. In Sec-
tions 6, 7, and 8, we expand on three independent topics related to our results.
In Section 6, we show that qualitative plausibility measures are more expressive
than previous semantics considered in the literature. In Section 7, we consider re-
lated work, focusing on the relationship between our approach to plausibility and
epistemic entrenchment [Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson 1988; Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson
1989; Grove 1988]. In Section 8, we discuss how plausibility measures can be used
to give semantics to a full logic of conditionals, and compare this with the more
traditional approach [Lewis 1973]. We conclude in Section 9 with a discussion of
other potential applications of plausibility measures.
2. PLAUSIBILITY MEASURES
A probability space is a tuple (W,F , µ), where W is a set of worlds, F is an
algebra of measurable subsets ofW (that is, a set of subsets closed under union and
complementation to which we assign probability), and µ is a probability measure,
that is, a function mapping each set in F to a number in [0, 1] satisfying the well-
known Kolmogorov axioms (µ(∅) = 0, µ(W ) = 1, and µ(A ∪ B) = µ(A) + µ(B) if
A and B are disjoint).1
A plausibility space is a direct generalization of a probability space. We simply
replace the probability measure µ by a plausibility measure Pl that, rather than
mapping sets in F to numbers in [0, 1], maps them to elements in some arbitrary
partially ordered set. We read Pl(A) as “the plausibility of set A”. If Pl(A) ≤
Pl(B), then B is at least as plausible as A. Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple
S = (W,F ,Pl), whereW is a set of worlds, F is an algebra of subsets of W , and Pl
1Frequently it is also assumed that µ satisfies countable additivity , i.e., if Ai, i > 0, are pairwise
disjoint, then µ(
⋃
i
Ai) =
∑
i
µ(Ai).
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maps the sets in F to some set D, partially ordered by a relation ≤D (so that ≤D is
reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric). We assume that D is pointed , that is, it
contains two special elements ⊤D and ⊥D such that ⊥D≤D d ≤D ⊤D for all d ∈ D;
we further assume that Pl(W ) = ⊤D and Pl(∅) =⊥D. The only other assumption
we make is
A1. If A ⊆ B, then Pl(A) ≤D Pl(B).
Thus, a set must be at least as plausible as any of its subsets.
Some brief remarks on the definition: We have deliberately suppressed the do-
main D from the tuple S, since the choice of D is not significant in this paper. All
that matters is the ordering induced by ≤D on the subsets in F .2 As usual, we
define the ordering <D by taking d1 <D d2 if d1 ≤D d2 and d1 6= d2. We omit
the subscript D from ≤D, <D, ⊤D, and ⊥D whenever it is clear from context. We
also frequently omit the F when describing a plausibility space when its role is not
that significant, and just denote a plausibility space as a pair (W,Pl) rather than
(W,F ,Pl).
Clearly plausibility spaces generalize probability spaces. We now briefly discuss
a few other notions of uncertainty that they generalize:
—A belief function Bel on W is a function Bel : 2W → [0, 1] satisfying certain
axioms [Shafer 1976]. These axioms certainly imply property A1, so a belief
function is a plausibility measure.
—A fuzzy measure (or a Sugeno measure) f on W [Wang and Klir 1992] is a
function f : 2W 7→ [0, 1], that satisfies A1 and some continuity constraints. A
possibility measure [Dubois and Prade 1990] Poss is a fuzzy measure such that
Poss(W ) = 1, Poss(∅) = 0, and Poss(A) = supw∈A(Poss({w}).
—An ordinal ranking (or κ-ranking) κ on W (as defined by [Goldszmidt and
Pearl 1992], based on ideas that go back to [Spohn 1988]) is a function map-
ping subsets of W to IN∗ = IN ∪ {∞} such that κ(W ) = 0, κ(∅) = ∞, and
κ(A) = minw∈A(κ({w})). Intuitively, an ordinal ranking assigns a degree of
surprise to each subset of worlds in W , where 0 means unsurprising and higher
numbers denote greater surprise. It is easy to see that if κ is a ranking on W ,
then (W,κ) is a plausibility space, where x ≤IN∗ y if and only if y ≤ x under the
usual ordering on the ordinals.
—A preference ordering on W is a strict partial order ≺ over W [Kraus et al. 1990;
Shoham 1987]. Intuitively, w ≺ w′ holds if w is preferred to w′.3 Preference
orders have been used to provide semantics for default (i.e., conditional) state-
ments. In Section 4 we show how to map preference orders on W to plausibility
measures on W in a way that preserves the ordering on worlds as well as the
truth values of defaults.
—A parameterized probability distribution (PPD) on W is a sequence {Pri : i ≥ 0}
of probability measures over W . Such structures provide semantics for defaults
2In dealing with conditional plausibility, the domain D plays a more significant role [Friedman
and Halpern 1995].
3We follow the standard notation for preference here [Lewis 1973; Kraus et al. 1990], which uses
the (perhaps confusing) convention of placing the more likely (or less abnormal) world on the left
of the ≺ operator.
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in ǫ-semantics [Pearl 1989; Goldszmidt et al. 1993]. In Section 4 we show how
to map PPDs on W to plausibility measures on W in a way that preserves the
truth-values of conditionals.
Plausibility structures are motivated by much the same concerns as two other
recent symbolic generalizations of probability by Darwiche [1992] and Weydert
[1994b]. Their approaches have a great deal more structure though. They start
with a domain D and several algebraic operations that have properties similar to
the usual arithmetic operations (e.g., addition and multiplication) over [0, 1]. The
result is an algebraic structure over the domain D that satisfies various properties.
Their structures are also general enough to capture all of the examples above except
preferential orderings. These orderings cannot be captured precisely because of the
additional structure. Moreover, as we shall see, by starting with very little structure
and adding just what we need, we can sometimes bring to light issues that may
be obscured in richer frameworks. We refer the interested reader to [Friedman and
Halpern 1995] for a more detailed comparison to [Darwiche 1992; Weydert 1994b].
Given the simplicity and generality of plausibility measures, we were not surprised
to discover that Weber [1991] recently defined a notion of uncertainty measures,
which is a slight generalization of plausibility measure (in that domains more general
than algebras of sets are allowed), and that Greco [1987] defined a notion of L-fuzzy
measures which is somewhat more restricted than plausibility measures in that the
range D is a complete lattice. We expect that others have used variants of this
notion as well, although we have not found any further references in the literature.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to carry out a systematic investigation
of the connection between plausibility measures and default reasoning.
3. APPROACHES TO DEFAULT REASONING: A REVIEW
Defaults are statements of the form “if φ then typically/likely/by default ψ”, which
we denote φ→ψ. For example, the default “birds typically fly” is represented
Bird→Fly . Formally, we assume that there is a “base” language L, defined over a
set Φ of propositions, that includes the usual propositional connectives, ∧,∨,¬,⇒
and has a consequence relation ⊢L. The language of defaults Ldef contains state-
ments of the form φ→ψ, where φ, ψ ∈ L.
There has been a great deal of discussion in the literature as to what the appro-
priate semantics of defaults should be, and what new defaults should be entailed
by a knowledge base of defaults. For the most part, we do not get into these issues
here. While there has been little consensus on what the “right” semantics for de-
faults should be, there has been some consensus on a reasonable “core” of inference
rules for default reasoning. This core, known as the KLM properties [Kraus et al.
1990], consists of the following axiom and rules of inference.
LLE. If ⊢L φ⇔ φ′, then from φ→ψ infer φ′→ψ (left logical equivalence)
RW. If ⊢L ψ ⇒ ψ′, then from φ→ψ infer φ→ψ′ (right weakening)
REF. φ→φ (reflexivity)
AND. From φ→ψ1 and φ→ψ2 infer φ→ψ1 ∧ ψ2
OR. From φ1→ψ and φ2→ψ infer φ1 ∨ φ2→ψ
CM. From φ→ψ1 and φ→ψ2 infer φ ∧ ψ2→ψ1 (cautious monotonicity)
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LLE states that the syntactic form of the antecedent is irrelevant. Thus, if φ1 and φ2
are equivalent, we can deduce φ2→ψ from φ1→ψ. RW describes a similar property
of the consequent: If ψ (logically) entails ψ′, then we can deduce φ→ψ′ from φ→ψ.
This allows us to can combine default and logical reasoning. REF states that φ
is always a default conclusion of φ. AND states that we can combine two default
conclusions: If we can conclude by default both ψ1 and ψ2 from φ, then we can also
conclude ψ1 ∧ ψ2 from φ. OR states that we are allowed to reason by cases: If the
same default conclusion follows from each of two antecedents, then it also follows
from their disjunction. CM states that if ψ1 and ψ2 are two default conclusions of
φ, then discovering that ψ2 holds when φ holds (as would be expected, given the
default) should not cause us to retract the default conclusion ψ1.
This system of rules is called system P in [Kraus et al. 1990]. The notation
∆ ⊢P φ→ψ denotes that φ→ψ can be deduced from ∆ using these inference rules.
There are a number of well-known semantics for defaults that are characterized
by these rules. We sketch a few of them here, referring the reader to the orig-
inal references for further details and motivation. All of these semantics involve
structures of the form (W,X, π), where W is a set of possible worlds, π(w) is a
truth assignment consistent with ⊢L to formulas in L, and X is some “measure”
on W such as a preference ordering, a κ-ranking, or a possibility measure. We
define a little notation that will simplify the discussion below. Given a structure
M = (W,X, π) and a formula φ ∈ L, we take [[φ]]M ⊆ W to be the set of worlds
satisfying φ, i.e., [[φ]]M = {w ∈ W : π(w)(φ) = true}. We omit the subscript M
when it plays no role or is clear from the context.
The first semantic proposal was provided by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [1990],
using ideas that go back to [Hansson 1969; Lewis 1973; Shoham 1987]. Recall that
a preference ordering on W is strict partial order (i.e., an irreflexive and transitive
relation) ≺ overW . A preferential structure is a tuple (W,≺, π), where ≺ is a strict
partial order on W .4 The intuition [Shoham 1987] is that a preferential structure
satisfies a conditional φ→ψ if all the most preferred worlds (i.e., the minimal worlds
according to ≺) in [[φ]] satisfy ψ. However, there may be no minimal worlds in [[φ]].
This can happen if [[φ]] contains an infinite descending sequence . . . ≺ w2 ≺ w1.
What do we do in these structures? There are a number of options: the first is to
assume that, for each formula φ, there are minimal worlds in [[φ]] whenever [[φ]] is
not empty; this is the assumption actually made in [Kraus et al. 1990], where it is
called the smoothness assumption. A yet more general definition—one that works
even if ≺ is not smooth—is given in [Bossu and Siegel 1985; Boutilier 1994; Lewis
1973]. Roughly speaking, φ→ψ is true if, from a certain point on, whenever φ is
true, so is ψ. More formally,
(W,≺, π) satisfies φ→ψ if, for every world w1 ∈ [[φ]], there is a world w2
4 We note that the formal definition of preferential structures in [Kraus et al. 1990; Lehmann
and Magidor 1992] is slightly more complex. Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor distinguish between
states and worlds. In their definition, a preferential structure is an ordering over states together
with a labeling function that maps states to worlds. They take worlds to be truth assignments to
primitive propositions. Our worlds thus correspond to states in their terminology, since we allow
two worlds w 6= w′ such that π(w) = π(w′). Despite these minor differences, all the results that
we prove for our version of preferential structures hold (with almost no change in proof) for theirs.
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such that (a) w2  w1 (i.e., either w2 ≺ w1 or w2 = w1 ) (b) w2 ∈ [[φ∧ψ]],
and (c) for all worlds w3 ≺ w2, we have w3 ∈ [[φ ⇒ ψ]] (so any world
more preferred than w2 that satisfies φ also satisfies ψ).
It is easy to verify that this definition is equivalent to the earlier one if ≺ is smooth.
A knowledge-base ∆ preferentially entails φ→ψ, denoted ∆ |=p φ→ψ, if every
preferential structure that satisfies (all the defaults in) ∆ also satisfies φ→ψ.
Lehmann and Magidor show that preferential entailment is characterized by sys-
tem P.
Theorem 3.1. [Lehmann and Magidor 1992; Boutilier 1994] ∆ |=p φ→ψ if and
only if ∆ ⊢P φ→ψ.
Thus, reasoning with preferential structures corresponds in a precise sense to rea-
soning with the core properties of default reasoning.
As we mentioned earlier, we usually want to add additional inferences to those
sanctioned by the core. Lehmann and Magidor [1992] hoped to do so by restricting
to a special class of preferential structures. A preferential structure (W,≺, π) is
rational if ≺ is a modular order, so that for all worlds u, v, w ∈ W , if w ≺ v,
then either u ≺ v or w ≺ u. It is not hard to show that modularity implies that
possible worlds are clustered into equivalence classes, each class consisting of worlds
that are incomparable to one another, with these classes being totally ordered.
Thus, rational structures form a “well-behaved” subset of preferential structures.
Unfortunately, Lehmann and Magidor showed that restricting to rational structures
gives no additional properties (at least, as far as the limited language of defaults
is concerned). We say that a knowledge base ∆ rationally entails φ→ψ, denoted
∆ |=r φ→ψ, if every rational structure that satisfies ∆ also satisfies φ→ψ.5
Theorem 3.2. [Lehmann and Magidor 1992] ∆ |=r φ→ψ if and only if ∆ ⊢P
φ→ψ.
Thus, we do not gain any new patterns of default inference when we restrict our
attention to rational structures.
This is perhaps somewhat surprising, since it is is known that rational structures
do satisfy the following additional property, known as rational monotonicity [Kraus
et al. 1990; Lehmann and Magidor 1992]:
RM If φ→ψ1 and φ6→¬ψ2 then φ ∧ ψ2→ψ1.
Note that RM is almost the same as CM, except that φ→ψ2 is replaced by the
weaker φ6→¬ψ2.
How can the existence of this additional property be consistent with the fact both
that rational and preferential structures are characterized by system P? The key
point is that although RM is an additional property satisfied by rational structures,
it is not one that is expressible in the language of defaults (because we do not allow
negated defaults). As we shall see in Section 8, once we move to a richer language,
rational structures are distinguishable form arbitrary preferential structures.
5Rational entailment should not be confused with the notion of rational closure, also defined by
Lehmann and Magidor [1992].
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Pearl [1989] considers a semantics for defaults grounded in probability, using an
approach due to Adams [1975]. In this approach, a default φ→ψ denotes that
Pr(ψ|φ) is extremely high, i.e., almost 1. Roughly speaking, a collection ∆ of
defaults implies a default φ→ψ if we can ensure that Pr(φ|ψ) is arbitrarily close to
1, by taking the probabilities of the defaults in ∆ to be sufficiently high.
The formal definition needs a bit of machinery.6 Recall that a PPD on W is a
sequence {Pri : i ≥ 0} of probability measures over W . A PPD structure is a tuple
(W, {Pri : i ≥ 0}, π), where {Pri} is PPD onW . Intuitively, it satisfies a conditional
φ→ψ if the conditional probability ψ given φ goes to 1 in the limit. Formally,
φ→ψ is satisfied if limi→∞ Pri([[ψ]]|[[φ]]) = 1 (where Pri([[ψ]]|[[φ]]) is taken to be 1 if
Pri([[φ]]) = 0). ∆ ǫ-entails φ→ψ, denoted ∆ |=ǫ φ→ψ, if every PPD structure that
satisfies all the defaults in ∆ also satisfies φ→ψ. Surprisingly, Geffner shows that
ǫ-entailment is equivalent to preferential entailment.
Theorem 3.3. [Geffner 1992b] ∆ |=ǫ φ→ψ if and only if ∆ ⊢P φ→φ.7
Possibility measures and ordinal rankings provide two more semantics for de-
faults. A possibility structure is a tuple PS = (W,Poss, π) such that Poss is a
possibility measure on W . We say PS |=Poss φ→ψ if either Poss([[φ]]) = 0 or
Poss([[φ ∧ ψ]]) > Poss([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]). Intuitively, φ→ψ holds vacuously if φ is impos-
sible; otherwise, it holds if φ ∧ ψ is more “possible” than φ ∧ ¬ψ. For example,
Bird→Fly is satisfied when Bird ∧Fly is more possible than Bird ∧¬Fly . Similarly,
an ordinal ranking structure is a tuple R = (W,κ, π) if κ is an ordinal ranking on
W . We say that R |=κ φ→ψ if either κ([[φ]]) =∞ or κ([[φ∧ψ]]) < κ([[φ∧¬ψ]]). We
say that ∆ possibilistically entails φ→ψ, denoted ∆ |=Poss φ→ψ (resp., ∆ κ-entails
φ→ψ, denoted ∆ |=κ φ→ψ) if all possibility structures (resp., all ordinal ranking
structures) that satisfy ∆ also satisfy φ→ψ.
These two approaches are again characterized by the KLM properties.
Theorem 3.4. [Geffner 1992b; Dubois and Prade 1991] The following are equiv-
alent:
(a) ∆ |=Poss φ→ψ
(b) ∆ |=κ φ→ψ
(c) ∆ ⊢P φ→ψ.
Why do we always seem to end up with the KLM properties? As we are about to
show, thinking in terms of plausibility measures provides the key to understanding
this issue.
4. DEFAULT REASONING USING PLAUSIBILITY
We can give semantics to defaults using plausibility measures much as we did using
possibility measures. A plausibility structure (for L) is a tuple PL = (W,F ,Pl, π),
where (W,F ,Pl) is a plausibility space and π maps each possible world to a truth
6We adopt the presentation used in [Goldszmidt et al. 1993].
7Geffner’s result is stated in terms of the original formulation of ǫ-entailment, as described in
[Pearl 1989]. However, results of [Goldszmidt et al. 1993] show that the formulation we describe
here is equivalent to the original one.
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assignment to the formulas in L that is consistent with ⊢L in the obvious sense.
Since we will be interested in events that correspond to formulas, we require that
[[φ]] ∈ F for all formula φ ∈ L. For ease of exposition, when describing a plausibility
structure for L, we assume that F = {[[φ]] : φ ∈ L}. Just as with plausibility spaces,
we typically omit the algebra F from the description of a plausibility structure. We
define PL |=PL φ→ψ if either Pl([[φ]]) =⊥ or Pl([[φ ∧ ψ]]) > Pl([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]).
Notice that if Pl is a probability function Pr, then φ→ψ holds exactly if either
Pr([[φ]]) = 0 or Pr([[ψ]]|[[φ]]) > 1/2. How does this semantics for defaults compare to
others that have been given in the literature? It is immediate from the definitions
that the semantics we give to defaults in possibility structures is the same as that
given to them if we view these possibility structures as plausibility structures (using
the obvious mapping described in Section 3), and similarly for ordinal ranking
structures. What about preferential structures and PPD structures? Can we map
them into plausibility structures while still preserving the semantics of defaults?
As we now show, we can.
In fact, Lemma 4.1 shows that there is a general procedure for mapping any
approach that satisfies the KLM postulates to plausibility measures. Before de-
scribing this general construction, we briefly sketch its instantiation in the case of
PPDs and preferential structures.
We start with PPDs. Let PP = (W, {Pri}, π) be a PPD structure. Let PlPP be
a plausibility measure on W such that
PlPP (A) ≤ PlPP (B) if and only if lim
i→∞
Pri(B|A ∪B) = 1. (1)
It is easy to check that such a plausibility measure exists and that (W,PlPP , π)
satisfies the same defaults as PP . We note that this construction, as well as others
in the remainder of the paper, specifies only the relative order of plausibilities of
events, and does not describe the domain of plausibility values. It is easy to check
that as long as the ordering constraints are consistent with reflexivity, transitivity,
and A1, we can always construct a matching plausibility domain.8 From here on,
we treat such ordering constraints as though they define a plausibility measure.
We stress that this embedding, which is sufficient for the purpose of this work,
is not the only one possible. To see this, suppose that A and B are disjoint sets
such that Pri(A) = Pri(B) for all i. One might argue that the plausibility of A and
B should be equal. Yet our definition would make Pl(A) and Pl(B) incomparable
since Pri(B|A ∪B) = 0.5 for all i.
The construction for mapping preferential structures into plausibility structures
is slightly more complex. Suppose we are given a preferential structure (W,≺, π).
Let D0 be the domain of plausibility values consisting of one element dw for every
element w ∈ W . We use ≺ to determine the order of these elements: dv < dw if
w ≺ v. (Recall that w ≺ w′ denotes that w is preferred to w′.) We then take D to
be the smallest set containing D0 closed under least upper bounds (so that every
set of elements in D has a least upper bound in D). It is not hard to show that
D is well-defined (i.e., there is a unique, up to renaming, smallest set) and that
taking Pl≺(A) to be the least upper bound of {dw : w ∈ A} gives us the following
8For example, we can take the domain of the plausibility measure to consist of sets of logically
equivalent formulas, partially ordered so as to satisfy the constraints.
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property:
Pl≺(A) ≤ Pl≺(B) if and only if for all w ∈ A − B, there is a world
w′ ∈ B such that w′ ≺ w and there is no w′′ ∈ A − B such that
w′′ ≺ w′.
(2)
Again, it is easy to check that (W,Pl≺, π) satisfies the same defaults as (W,≺, π).
We now present our general construction.
Lemma 4.1. Let W be a set of possible worlds and let π be a function that maps
each world in W to a truth assignment to L. Let T ⊆ Ldef be a set of defaults that
is closed under the rules of system P that satisfies the following condition:
(∗) if φ→ψ ∈ T , [[φ]] = [[φ′]], and [[ψ]] = [[ψ′]], then φ′→ψ′ ∈ T , for all
formulas φ, φ′, ψ, ψ′ ∈ L.
There is a plausibility structure PLT = (W,PlT , π) such that PlT ([[φ]]) ≤ PlT ([[ψ]])
if and only if φ ∨ ψ→ψ ∈ T . Moreover, PLT |= φ→ψ if and only if φ→ψ ∈ T .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Theorem 4.2. (a) Let PP = {Pri} be a PPD on W . There is a plausibility
measure PlPP onW such that (W, {Pri}, π) |=ǫ φ→ψ if and only if (W,PlPP , π) |=PL
φ→ψ.
(b) Let ≺ be a preference ordering on W . There is a plausibility measure Pl≺ on
W such that (W,≺, π) |=p φ→ψ if and only if (W,Pl≺, π) |=PL φ→ψ.
Proof. We start with part (a). Set TPP = {φ→ψ : (W,PP, π) |=ǫ φ→ψ}.
Theorem 3.3 implies that TPP is closed under the KLM rules. Moreover, since T is
constructed from a PPD overW using π it satisfies the requirement of Lemma 4.1. It
follows that we can construct a plausibility structure that satisfies the requirements
of the theorem. It is also easy to verify that this construction agrees with the
construction described earlier, in that it satisfies constraint (1). To see this, let
A,B ∈ F . Then, according to our assumptions, there are formulas φ and ψ such
that A = [[φ]] and B = [[ψ]]. By definition, PlPP (A) ≤ PlPP (B) if and only if
(W,PP, π) |=ǫ (φ ∨ ψ)→ψ. From definition of |=ǫ we immediately get (1).
The proof of part (b) is identical, using Theorem 3.1. Again, an analogous
argument easily shows that Pl≺ satisfies (2).
Thus, each of the semantic approaches to default reasoning that were considered
in Section 3 can be mapped into plausibility structures in a way that preserves
the semantics of defaults. We remark that these mapping are not unique. For
example, Freund [1996] gives an alternative mapping from preferential structures
to plausibility measures.
Other semantics for defaults can also be mapped into plausibility measures using
the general technique of Lemma 4.1. In most cases, we can also establish a direct
relationship between these semantics and plausibility measures. For example, the
coherent filters approach of [Ben-David and Ben-Eliyahu 1994; Schlechta 1995] can
be mapped to plausibility, as shown by Schlechta [1996], and Weydert’s full ranking
measures [1994a] are easily seen to be a special case of plausibility measures.
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5. DEFAULT ENTAILMENT IN PLAUSIBILITY STRUCTURES
In this section we characterize default entailment in plausibility structures. To
do so, it is useful to have a somewhat more general definition of entailment in
plausibility structures.
Definition 5.1. If S is a class of plausibility structures, then a knowledge base
∆ entails φ→ψ with respect to S, denoted ∆ |=S φ→ψ, if every plausibility struc-
ture PL ∈ S that satisfies all the defaults in ∆ also satisfies φ→ψ.
The classes of structures we are interested in include SPL, the class of all plausibility
structures, and SPoss, Sκ, Sp, Sr, and Sǫ, the classes that arise from mapping
possibility structures, ordinal ranking structures, preferential structures, rational
structures, and PPDs, respectively, into plausibility structures. (In the case of
possibility structures and ordinal ranking structures, the mapping is the obvious
one discussed in Section 2; in the case of preferential, rational and PPD structures,
the mapping is the one described in Theorem 4.2.) Recall that all these mappings
preserve the semantics of defaults.
It is easy to check that our semantics for defaults does not guarantee that the
axioms of system P hold in all structures in SPL. In particular, they do not
hold in probability structures. For a counterexample, consider a plausibility struc-
ture PL = (W,Pl, π), where Pl is actually a probability measure Pr such that
Pr([[q ∧ r]]) = 0.2 and Pr([[q ∧ ¬r]]) = Pr([[¬q ∧ r]]) = 0.4. Thus, Pr([[q]]) = .6 and
Pr([[q]]|[[r]]) = 1/3. Recall that if Pr([[φ]]) > 0, then PL |=PL φ→ψ if and only if
Pr([[ψ]]|[[φ]]) > .5. Thus, PL |=PL (true→q) ∧ (true→r), but PL6|=PLtrue→(q ∧ r)
and PL6|=PLr→q. This gives us a violation of both AND and CM. We can simi-
larly construct a counterexample to OR. On the other hand, as the following result
shows, plausibility structures do satisfy the other three axioms of system P. Let
system P′ be the system consisting of LLE, RW, and REF.
Theorem 5.2. If ∆ ⊢P′ φ→ψ, then ∆ |=SPL φ→ψ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
What extra conditions do we have to place on plausibility structures to ensure
that AND, OR, and CM are satisfied? We focus first on the AND rule. We want
an axiom that cuts out probability functions, but leaves more qualitative notions.
Working at a semantic level, taking [[φ]] = A, [[ψ1]] = B1, and [[ψ2]] = B2, and using
X to denote the complement of X , the AND rule translates to
A2
′
. For all sets A, B1, and B2, if Pl(A ∩ B1) > Pl(A ∩ B1) and Pl(A ∩ B2) >
Pl(A ∩B2), then Pl(A ∩B1 ∩B2) > Pl(A ∩ (B1 ∩B2)).
It turns out that in the presence of A1, the following somewhat simpler axiom is
equivalent to A2′:
A2. If A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets, Pl(A∪B) > Pl(C), and Pl(A∪C) >
Pl(B), then Pl(A) > Pl(B ∪C).
Proposition 5.3. A plausibility measure satisfies A2 if and only if it satisfies
A2′.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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A2 can be viewed as a generalization of a natural requirement of qualitative
plausibility: if A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint, Pl(A) > Pl(B), and Pl(A) >
Pl(C), then Pl(A) > Pl(B ∪ C). Moreover, since A2 is equivalent to A2′, and A2′
is a direct translation of the AND rule into conditions on plausibility measures,
any plausibility structure whose plausibility measure satisfies A2 also satisfies the
AND rule. Somewhat surprisingly, a plausibility measure Pl that satisfies A2 also
satisfies CM. Moreover, Pl satisfies the non-vacuous case of the OR rule. That is,
if Pl([[φ1]]) > ⊥, then from φ1→ψ and φ2→ψ we can conclude (φ1 ∨ φ2)→ψ.9 To
handle the vacuous case of OR we need an additional axiom:
A3. If Pl(A) = Pl(B) = ⊥, then Pl(A ∪B) = ⊥.
Thus, A2 and A3 capture the essence of the KLM properties. To make this precise,
define a plausibility space (W,Pl) to be qualitative if it satisfies A2 and A3 in addi-
tion to A1. We say PL = (W,Pl, π) is a qualitative plausibility structure if (W,Pl)
is a qualitative plausibility space. Let SQPL consist of all qualitative plausibility
structures.
Theorem 5.4. S ⊆ SQPL if and only if for all ∆, φ, and ψ, if ∆ ⊢P φ→ψ then
∆ |=S φ→ψ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Thus, the KLM axioms are sound for qualitative plausibility structures. We
remark that Theorem 5.4 provides not only a sufficient but a necessary condition
for a set of plausibility structures to satisfy the KLM properties: If the KLM axioms
are sound with respect to S, then all PL ∈ S must be qualitative.
This, of course, leads to the question of which plausibility structures are qualita-
tive. All the ones we have been focusing on are.
Theorem 5.5. Each of SPoss, Sκ, Sǫ, Sp, and Sr is a subset of SQPL.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
It follows from Theorems 5.4 and 5.5 that the KLM properties hold in all the
approaches to default reasoning considered in Section 3. While this fact was already
known, this result gives us a deeper understanding as to why the KLM properties
should hold. In a precise sense, it is because A2 and A3 hold for all these approaches.
We now consider completeness. To get soundness, we have to ensure that S does
not contain too many structures, in particular, no structures that are not qualita-
tive. To get completeness, we have to ensure that S contains “enough” structures.
In particular, if ∆ 6⊢P φ→ψ, we want to ensure that there is a plausibility structure
PL ∈ S such that PL |=PL ∆ and PL 6|=PLφ→ψ. The following weak condition on
S does this.
9We remark that if we dropped requirement A1, then we can define properties of plausibilities
measures that correspond precisely to CM and OR. The point is that in the presence of A1, A2—
which essentially corresponds to AND—implies CM and the non-vacuous case of OR. Despite
appearances, A1 does not correspond to RW. Semantically, RW says that if A and B are disjoint
sets such that Pl(A) > Pl(B), and A ⊆ A′, B′ ⊆ B, and A′ and B′ are disjoint, then Pl(A′) >
Pl(B′). While this follows from A1, it is much weaker than A1.
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Definition 5.6. We say that S is rich if for every collection φ1, . . . , φn, n > 1,
of mutually exclusive formulas, there is a plausibility structure PL = (W,Pl, π) ∈ S
such that:
Pl([[φ1]]) > Pl([[φ2]]) > · · · > Pl([[φn]]) = ⊥.
The richness requirement is quite mild. It says that we do not have a priori
constraints on the relative plausibilities of a collection of disjoint sets. Theorem 5.7
shows that every collection of plausibility measures that we have considered thus
far can be easily shown to satisfy this richness condition. More importantly, The-
orem 5.8 shows that richness is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that
the KLM properties are complete.
Theorem 5.7. Each of SPoss, Sκ, Sp, Sr, Sǫ, and SQPL is rich.
Proof. Let φ1, . . . , φn, n > 1, be mutually exclusive formulas and let W =
{w1, . . . , wn−1}. Since φ1, . . . , φn are mutually exclusive, we can construct a map-
ping π that maps each world in W to a truth assignment such that [[φi]] = wi for
all 1 ≤ i < n, and [[φn]] = ∅. Recall that we need to find a plausibility measure Pl
such that Pl([[φ1]]) > Pl([[φ2]]) > · · · > Pl([[φn]]) = ⊥. It is easy to find a plausibility
measure Pl satisfying this property such that (W,Pl, π) is in SPoss, Sκ, Sp, Sr, Sǫ,
or SQPL. For example, to get a structure in SPoss, we define Poss(wi) = 1 −
i
n
.
To get a structure in Sp, we define Pl to correspond to the preference ordering
w1 ≺ w2 ≺ . . . ≺ wn−1.
Theorem 5.8. A set S of qualitative plausibility structures is rich if and only if
for all finite ∆ and defaults φ→ψ, we have that ∆ |=S φ→ψ implies ∆ ⊢P φ→ψ.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Note that Theorem 5.8 deals with what is usually considered to be weak com-
pleteness. The strong notion of completeness would require us to remove the re-
striction that ∆ is finite from the statement of the theorem. It is possible to find a
stronger notion of richness that corresponds to strong completeness, but the details
are somewhat cumbersome, so we do not provide them here. Note that if |=S is
compact, then weak completeness implies strong completeness.
Putting together Theorems 5.4, 5.5, and 5.8, we get
Corollary 5.9. For S ∈ {SPoss,Sκ,Sp,Sr,Sǫ,SQPL}, and all ∆, φ, and ψ,
we have ∆ ⊢P φ→ψ if and only if ∆ |=S φ→ψ.
Not only does this result gives us a straightforward and uniform proof that the
KLM properties characterize default reasoning in each of the systems considered
in Section 3, it gives us a general technique for proving completeness of the KLM
properties for other semantics as well. All we have to do is to provide a mapping of
the intended semantics into plausibility structures, which is usually straightforward,
and then show that the resulting set of structures is qualitative and rich.
Theorem 5.8 also has important implications for attempts to go beyond the KLM
properties (as was the goal in introducing rational structures). It says that any se-
mantics for defaults that proceeds by considering a class S of qualitative structures
satisfying the richness constraint, and defining ∆ |=S φ→ψ to hold if φ→ψ is
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true in every structure in S that satisfies ∆, cannot lead to new properties for
entailment.
Thus, to go beyond KLM, we need to either consider interesting non-rich classes
of structures or to define a notion of entailment from ∆ that does not consider all
the structures of a given class. We are not aware of any work that takes the first
approach, although it is possible to construct classes of structures that are arguably
interesting and violate the richness constraint. One way is to impose independence
constraints. For example, suppose the language includes primitive propositions p
and q, and we consider all structures where p is independent of q in the sense that
if any of true→q, p→q, and ¬p→q holds, then the others also do. This means that
discovering either p or ¬p does not affect whether or not q is believed.10 Restricting
to such structures clearly gives us extra properties. For example, from true→q we
can infer p→q, which certainly does not follow from the KLM properties. Such
structures do not satisfy the richness constraint, since we cannot have, for example,
Pl([[p ∧ q]]) > Pl([[p ∧ ¬q]]) > Pl([[¬p ∧ ¬q]]) > Pl([[¬p ∧ q]]).
Much of the recent work in default reasoning [Bacchus et al. 1993; Geffner 1992a;
Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992; Goldszmidt et al. 1993; Lehmann and Magidor 1992;
Pearl 1990] has taken the second approach. Roughly speaking, this approach can
be viewed as taking the basic idea of preferential semantics—placing a preference
ordering on worlds—one step further: We try to get from a knowledge base a set of
preferred structures (where the structures themselves put a preference ordering on
worlds)—for example, in [Goldszmidt et al. 1993], the PPD of maximum entropy is
considered—and carry out all reasoning in these preferred structures. We believe
that plausibility measures will provide insight into techniques for choosing such
preferred structures. For example, we might want to prefer structures where things
are “as independent as possible”. We believe that it should be possible to capture
this notion in a reasonable way using plausibility; we defer this to future work.
(See [Friedman and Halpern 1995] for discussion on independence in the context of
plausibility.)
6. EXPRESSIVENESS OF QUALITATIVE PLAUSIBILITY MEASURES
In the previous section we showed that all approaches to default reasoning are
instances of qualitative plausibility structures. We now show that each of the
classes considered in Theorem 5.5 is a strict subset of SQPL. This is clearly true in
a trivial sense. For example, if we consider a qualitative plausibility measure whose
range is [1, 2], it cannot be either a possibility measure or a κ-ranking. To get
around this problem, we define two plausibility spaces (W,Pl) and (W,Pl′) (resp.
, two plausibility structures (W,Pl, π) and (W,Pl′, π)) to be order-equivalent if for
A,B ⊆W , we have Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B) if and only if Pl′(A) ≤ Pl′(B).
We claim that for each of the classes of plausibility structures considered in The-
orem 5.5, there is a qualitative plausibility structure that is not order-equivalent
to any element of that class. This is almost immediate in the case of SPoss and
Sκ. Since both require ≤ to be a total order, a qualitative plausibility structure
(W,Pl, π) such that Pl does not place a total order on the plausibility of subsets
10We remark that if we define independence appropriately in plausibility structures, this property
does indeed hold; see [Friedman and Halpern 1995].
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cannot be order-equivalent to an element of SPoss or Sκ. We say a plausibility
structures (W,Pl, π) is totally ordered if Pl places a total order on subsets. As
the following proposition show, there are even totally-ordered qualitative plausibil-
ity structures that are not order-equivalent to any possibility structure or ordinal
ranking structure.
Proposition 6.1. There is a totally-ordered qualitative plausibility structure
that is not order-equivalent to any structure in SPoss, Sκ, Sp, or Sǫ.
Proof. Define a plausibility measure Pl on {a, b, c} such that Pl({a}) = Pl({b}) =
Pl({c}) = Pl({b, c}) = Pl({a, c}) = 1/2 and Pl({a, b}) = Pl({a, b, c}) = 1. It
is straightforward to check that Pl is qualitative and totally ordered. Moreover,
we have Pl({c}) < Pl({a, b}), although neither Pl({c}) < Pl({a}) nor Pl({c}) <
Pl({b}) hold. It is easy to see that there can be no possibility measure, κ-ranking,
preference ordering, or PPD on {a, b, c} such that the corresponding plausibility
space is order-equivalent to ({a, b, c},Pl). For example, if Poss is a possibility
measure on {a, b, c} such that Poss({c}) < Poss({a, b}, then we must have either
Poss({c}) < Poss({a} or Poss({c}) < Poss({b}). A similar observation holds for
κ-rankings. This plausibility space also cannot be equivalent to one that arises from
the construction of Lemma 4.1, since the construction never gives disjoint sets the
same plausibility. Since Pl({a}) = Pl({b}), the result follows.
If all that we are interested in is default reasoning, then all that matters is the
relative plausibility of disjoint sets. We say that two plausibility spaces (W,Pl) and
(W,Pl′) (resp. two plausibility structures (W,Pl, π) and (W,Pl′, π)) are default-
equivalent if for all disjoint subsets A and B of W , we have Pl(A) < Pl(B) if
and only if Pl′(A) < Pl′(B). Clearly, if structures (W,Pl, π) and (W,Pl′, π) are
default-equivalent, then they satisfy the same defaults.
We can strengthen Proposition 6.1 so that it applies to default-equivalence in the
case of possibility measures, κ-rankings, and preferential orders.
Proposition 6.2. There is a totally-ordered qualitative plausibility structure
that is not default-equivalent to any structure in SPoss, Sκ, or Sp.
Proof. The plausibility space described in the proof of Proposition 6.1 also
provides a counterexample for default-equivalence in the case of SPoss, Sκ, and
Sp.
Notice that Proposition 6.2 does not apply to Sǫ. Consider the PPD (Pr1,Pr2, . . .)
such that Prn(a) = 1/n, Pr2n−1(b) = 1 − 1/n, Pr2n−1(c) = 0, Pr2n(b) = 0,
Pr2n(c) = 1 − 1/n for all n ≥ 1. It is easy to check that the plausibility space
arising from this PPD is default-isomorphic to the one in Proposition 6.1.
It is not hard to construct a trivial plausibility structure that is not default-
isomorphic to any structure in Sǫ: Consider the trivial plausibility measure on
{a} such that Pl({a}) = ⊥. This cannot be default-isomorphic to a structure
in Sǫ, since if Pl′ is a plausibility measure in such a structure, we must have
Pl′({a}) = ⊤ > Pl′(∅). But this is essentially all that can go wrong. We say
that a plausibility space (W,Pl) (resp. plausibility structure (W,Pl, π)) is normal
(following Lewis [1973]) if Pl(W ) > ⊥. It is easy to see that all structures in Sǫ,
Sκ, and SPoss are normal.
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Theorem 6.3. If PL ∈ SQPL is a normal plausibility structure for a countable
language L, then there is a structure PL′ ∈ Sǫ that is default-equivalent to PL.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Corollary 6.4. If (W,Pl, π) is a normal, qualitative plausibility structure for
a countable language L, then there exists a structure (W,Pl′, π) ∈ Sǫ such that
(W,Pl, π) |= φ→ψ if and only if (W,Pl′, π) |= φ→ψ for all φ, ψ ∈ L .
Thus, with respect to conditional statements in a countable language, Sǫ is as
expressive (in a strong sense) as SQPL. However, for uncountable languages, there
is a difference between SQPL and Sǫ: Probability distributions can assign positive
weight only to a countable number of pairwise disjoint events, while qualitative
plausibility measures do not suffer from such constraints.
7. EPISTEMIC ENTRENCHMENT
There has been much work related to defaults and plausibility. It can roughly be
divided into three categories. The first consists of various approaches to dealing
with uncertainty such as the ones mentioned in Section 2. For a more detailed
comparison to such approaches see [Friedman and Halpern 1995]. The second
category consists of semantics for defaults that are discussed at length in Section 4.
The final category includes semantics for defaults that are linguistic in nature. The
most well known approach of this kind is epistemic entrenchment [Ga¨rdenfors and
Makinson 1988; Grove 1988]. This has been proposed as a semantics for belief
revision [Ga¨rdenfors 1988]. Recently, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [1989] proposed
using a similar notion of expectation ordering as a semantics for default reasoning.
We briefly review their approach here.
Let L be some logical language that includes the usual propositional connectives
with a compact consequence relation ⊢L that satisfies the axioms of propositional
logic. An expectation ordering ✂ on L is a relation over formulas in L that satisfies
the following requirements:
E1. ✂ is transitive,
E2. if ⊢L φ⇒ ψ then φ✂ ψ,
E3. for any φ and ψ, either φ✂ φ ∧ ψ or ψ ✂ φ ∧ ψ.
Intuitively, φ ✂ ψ if ψ is as at least as expected as φ, so the agent would not
retract his belief in ψ before retracting his belief in φ. We do not go here into the
motivation for E1–E3. It is not hard to verify that E1–E3 imply that ✂ is a total
preorder on L.
An expectation structure is a pair E = (L,✂), where ✂ is an expectation ordering
on L. Intuitively, E satisfies φ→ψ if ψ is the consequence of formulas that are
expected given φ. This definition hinges on the choice of formulas that are expected
given φ. Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson take these to be the formulas that are more
expected than ¬φ. Formally, an expectation structure E = (L,✂) satisfies a default
φ→ψ if {φ} ∪ {ξ : ¬φ ✁ ξ} ⊢L ψ, where φ ✁ ψ holds if φ ✂ ψ and not ψ ✂ φ. The
following result is almost immediate from the definitions:
Theorem 7.1. [Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson 1989] Let E = (L,✂) be an expecta-
tion structure. E |= φ→ψ if and only if ⊢L φ⇒ ψ or (φ⇒ ¬ψ)✁ (φ⇒ ψ).
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While this definition seems quite different than the one described in Section 4,
the two are in fact closely related. Notice that φ ⇒ ¬ψ is equivalent to ¬(φ ∧ ψ),
while φ ⇒ ψ is equivalent to ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ). Thus, the second clause in the theorem
above, which says (φ ⇒ ¬ψ) ✁ (φ ⇒ ψ), can be viewed as saying ¬(φ ∧ ψ) is less
expected than ¬(φ∧¬ψ); this is clearly much in the spirit of the second clause in the
definition of defaults in plausibility, which says that (φ∧ψ) must be more plausible
than (φ ∧ ¬ψ). If we identify p being more plausible than q with ¬p being less
expected than ¬q, they are equivalent. The first clause in the theorem, ⊢L φ⇒ ψ,
corresponds to the vacuous case that φ has plausibility⊥ in our definition. However,
as we now show, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson treat the vacuous case in a somewhat
nonstandard manner (which can still be captured using plausibility).
To make the relationship between expectation orderings and plausibility precise,
let E = (L,✂) be an expectation structure. We say that a set V ⊆ L is consistent
if for all φ1, . . . , φn ∈ V , we have 6⊢L ¬(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn). V is a maximal consistent
set if it is consistent and for each φ ∈ L, either φ ∈ V or ¬φ ∈ V . We now
construct a plausibility structure PLE = (WE ,PlE , πE). We define WE = {wV : V
is a maximally consistent subset of L} and πE(wV )(p) = true if p ∈ V . Finally,
we need to define PlE . The obvious choice is to define PlE([[φ]]) ≤ PlE([[ψ]]) if and
only if (¬ψ) ✂ (¬φ). It is easy to see that this implies that (φ⇒ ¬φ) ✁ (φ⇒ ψ) if
and only if PlE([[φ∧ψ]]) > PlE([[φ∧¬ψ]]). Thus, E and PLE agree on non-vacuous
defaults. However, suppose that PlE([[φ]]) = ⊥ for some consistent formula φ. It
follows that PLE |= φ→ψ for any ψ. On the other hand, it is not hard to show
that E |= φ→ψ if and only if ⊢L φ ⇒ ψ.11 We can easily modify the definition of
PlE to avoid this problem: We define PlE([[φ]]) ≤ PlE([[ψ]]) either if (¬ψ) ✂ (¬φ)
and it is not the case that true✂¬ψ or if [[φ]] ⊆ [[ψ]]. With this modified definition,
we get the desired result.
Proposition 7.2. If E is an expectation structure, then PLE is a plausibility
structure. Furthermore, E |= φ→ψ if and only if PLE |= φ→ψ.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
We now examine default entailment with respect to expectation orderings. Let
SE be the set of plausibility structures that correspond to expectation structures.
It is not hard to prove that
Theorem 7.3. SE is a subset of SQPL.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that if E satisfies E1–E3, then PLE sat-
isfies A2 and A3.
It immediately follows that the KLM properties are sound for default entailment
with expectation orderings, i.e., with respect to SE . The KLM properties, however,
are not complete with respect to SE . For example, if p and q are arbitrary primitive
11Proof sketch: The “if” direction follows from Theorem 7.1. For the “only if” direction,
PlE([[φ]]) = ⊥, so we must have true ✂ ¬φ. Since ⊢L ¬φ ⇒ (φ ⇒ ¬ψ), it follows from E1
and E2 that true ✂ (φ ⇒ ¬ψ). Moreover, since ⊢L (φ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ true we have (φ ⇒ ψ) ✂ true.
Thus, we cannot have (φ ⇒ ¬ψ) ✁ (φ ⇒ ψ), for otherwise, by E2, we would have true ✁ true, a
contradiction.
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propositions, then p→false entails q→false. This example is a consequence of a
property Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson call consistency preservation:
—E |= φ→false if and only if ⊢L φ⇒ false.
This property states that φ is totally implausible—that is, has plausibility ⊥—if
and only if it is inconsistent. This implies that no PlE ∈ S
E satisfies p→false, and
hence p→false entails, vacuously, all other defaults. Thus, one cannot specify that
events such as white∧black are impossible in the database ∆; these constraints must
be somehow embedded in ⊢L.
We note that expectation orderings are similar to plausibility measures in that
they order events. However, there are several differences. First, expectation order-
ings use formulas to denote events. (We remark that there are similar formulations
of probability theory [Jeffreys 1961] that are based on a linguistic description of
events.) Secondly, as shown by our construction of PLE , expectation orderings
order events according to the implausibility of their complements. (This type of
ordering is usually called the dual order [Dubois and Prade 1990; Friedman and
Halpern 1995; Shafer 1976].) Thirdly, the treatment of the vacuous case is slightly
different. This difference leads to additional properties of default entailment.
8. CONDITIONAL LOGIC
Up to now, we focused on whether a set of defaults implies another default. We
have not considered a full logic of defaults, with negated defaults, nested defaults,
and disjunctions of defaults. It is easy to extend all the approaches we defined so
far to deal with such a logic. Conditional logic is a logic that treats→ as a modal
operator. The syntax of the logic is simple: let LC be the language defined by
starting with primitive propositions, and closing off under ∧, ¬, and→. Formulas
can describe logical combination of defaults (e.g., (p→q) ∨ (p→¬q)) as well as
nested defaults (e.g., (p→q)→r).
We note that the connections between default reasoning and conditional logics
are well-known; see [Boutilier 1994; Crocco and Lamarre 1992; Kraus et al. 1990;
Katsuno and Satoh 1991]. We gloss over the subtle philosophical differences between
the two here.
The semantics of conditional logic is similar to the semantics of defaults. As
with defaults, we evaluate conditional statements such as φ→ψ by comparing the
plausibility of those worlds that satisfy φ∧ψ to the plausibility of those worlds that
satisfy φ ∧ ¬ψ. Unlike default reasoning, conditional logic allows us to combine
defaults with propositional statements. Thus, p∧ (q→r) is a formula of conditional
logic, and is satisfied if both p and q→r are satisfied. The truth of a formula such
as p∧ (q→r) depends on the world; p∧ (q→r) might be true in w1 and false in w2
if p is true at w1 and not at w2.
Conditional logic also allows us to consider nested conditionals. For example, to
evaluate (p→q)→r, we need to consider the plausibility of the worlds that satisfy r
and p→q and compare them to the plausibility of worlds that satisfy ¬r and p→q.
In the structures we considered in the preceding sections, a statement such as p→q
is determined by the global plausibility measure. Thus, the set of worlds that satisfy
p→q is either the empty set or W (i.e., all possible worlds). It is not hard to show
that, as a result of this, we can denest nested conditional statements. That is,
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every formula is equivalent to one without nested conditionals. (See [Friedman and
Halpern 1994] for a proof of this well-known observation.) The usual definition of
conditional logic [Lewis 1973] provides a nontrivial semantics for nested conditionals
by associating with each world a different preferential order over worlds. We can
give a similar definition based on plausibility measures.
A (generalized) plausibility structure is a tuple (W,P , π) where W and π are, as
usual, a set of worlds and a mapping from worlds to truth assignments, and P maps
each world w to a plausibility space (Ww,Fw,Plw) where Ww ⊆ W . Intuitively,
(Ww,Fw,Plw) describes the agent’s plausibility when she is in world w. We can
view the plausibility structures we defined in previous sections to be a special case
of generalized plausibility structures where P(w) is the same for all worlds w. For
the remainder of this section we focus on generalized plausibility structures, but
continue to refer to them as plausibility structures.
Given a plausibility structure PL = (W,P , π), we define what it means for a
formula φ to be true at a world w in PL. The definition for the propositional
connectives is standard; for→, we use the definition already given:
—(PL, w) |= p if π(w) |= p for a primitive proposition p
—(PL, w) |= ¬φ if (PL, w) 6|= φ
—(PL, w) |= φ ∧ ψ if (PL, w) |= φ and (PL, w) |= ψ
—(PL, w) |= φ→ψ if either Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) =⊥ or Plw([[φ ∧ ψ]](PL,w)) > Plw([[φ ∧
¬ψ]](PL,w)), where we define [[φ]](PL,w) = {w ∈ Ww : (Pl, w) |= φ}.
We can similarly define generalized structures that use preferential orderings, κ-
rankings, ǫ-semantics, or possibility measures instead of plausibility measures. As
before, all of these structures can be embedded in qualitative plausibility structures.
We denote by SQPLc the class of all qualitative generalized plausibility structures,
and similarly denote the subclasses that correspond to various semantics (e.g., Spc
is the class that consists of plausibility structures based on preference orderings).
We saw that with default reasoning, we could not distinguish between plausibility,
possibility, preference orderings, ǫ-semantics, and κ-rankings. What happens when
we move to the richer language of conditional logic? As we shall see, this richer
language allows us to make some finer distinctions.
We start by examining preferential structures. There is a complete axiomati-
zation for conditional logic with respect to preferential structures due to Burgess
[1981] called System C, consisting of the following axioms and inference rules:
C0. All substitution instances of propositional tautologies
C1. φ→φ
C2. ((φ→ψ1) ∧ (φ→ψ2))⇒ (φ→(ψ1 ∧ ψ2))
C3. ((φ1→ψ) ∧ (φ2→ψ))⇒ ((φ1 ∨ φ2)→ψ)
C4. ((φ1→φ2) ∧ (φ1→ψ))⇒ ((φ1 ∧ φ2)→ψ)
R1. From φ and φ⇒ ψ infer ψ
RC1. From φ⇔ φ′ infer (φ→ψ)⇒ (φ′→ψ)
RC2. From ψ ⇒ ψ′ infer (φ→ψ)⇒ (φ→ψ′)
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System C can be viewed as a generalization of system P. The richer language lets
us replace a rule like AND by the axiom C2. Similarly, C1, C3, C4, RC1, and RC2
are the analogues of REF, OR, CM, LLE, and RW, respectively. We need C0 and
R1 to deal with propositional reasoning.
Theorem 8.1. [Burgess 1981] System C is a sound and complete axiomatization
of LC with respect to Spc .
Since the axioms of system C are clearly valid in all the structures in SQPLc and
Spc ⊆ S
QPL
c , we immediately get the following:
Theorem 8.2. System C is a sound and complete axiomatization of LC with
respect to SQPLc .
The proof of Theorem 8.1 given by Burgess is quite complicated. We can get a
simpler direct proof of Theorem 8.2, without going through Theorem 8.1, by using
standard techniques of modal logic. We provide the details in Appendix A.5.
Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 show that, even in the richer framework of conditional
logic, we cannot distinguish between preferential orders and plausibility, at least
not axiomatically. What about the other approaches we have been considering?
Not surprisingly, conditional logic does allow us to distinguish rational structures
from arbitrary preferential structures, because now we can express RM within the
language, using the following axiom:
C5. φ→ψ ∧ ¬(φ→¬ξ)⇒ φ ∧ ξ→ψ
Does C5 (together with system C) characterize Src ? Almost, but not quite.
We say that a plausibility measure Pl is rational if it satisfies the following two
properties:
A4. For all pairwise disjoint sets A,B and C, if Pl(A) < Pl(B), then Pl(A) < Pl(C)
or Pl(C) < Pl(B).
A5. For all pairwise disjoint sets A,B and C, if Pl(A) < Pl(B ∪C), then Pl(A) <
Pl(B) or Pl(A) < Pl(C).
A4 says that ordering of disjoint sets is modular. (Recall that an ordering is modular
if there are no three elements x, y, z such that x > y and z incomparable to both
x and y.) A5 says that the plausibility of B ∪C is essentially the maximum of the
plausibility of B and C. Thus, B ∪C cannot be more plausible than A, unless one
of the components is more plausible than A.
It is not hard to show that C5 is valid in, and only in, systems where the plausi-
bility ordering is rational.
Proposition 8.3. Let S ⊆ SQPLc . C5 is valid in S if and only if all structures
in S are rational.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
It is easy to verify that rational preference orderings, κ-rankings, and possibility
measures are all classes of rational structures. It immediately follows that C5 is
valid in each of Src , S
Poss
c , and S
κ
c . On the other hand, C5 it is not valid in S
p
c ,
since we can easily construct preferential structures that violate A4 and A5.
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As we said above, condition A4 states that the ordering is “almost” modular, in
the sense that, when restricted to pairwise disjoint sets, it is modular. It is not
surprising to see modularity arise in this context. It is well known that a modular
ordering induces a total order. More precisely, if < is a modular order on some set
and we define x ≤ y as y 6< x, then ≤ is a total order, that is, a partial order such
that either x ≤ y or y ≤ x for all x and y. All approaches that satisfy rational
monotonicity that have been proposed in the literature involve structures where
there is a total or modular order on worlds (e.g., rational preference orderings,
κ-rankings, and possibility measures).
We say that a plausibility measure Pl is a ranking if it satisfies the following two
properties:
A4
′
. ≤D is a total order; that is, either Pl(A) ≤D Pl(B) or Pl(B) ≤D Pl(A) for
all sets A,B.
A5
′
. Pl(A ∪B) = max(Pl(A),Pl(B)) for all sets A,B.
It is easy to see that A4′ implies A4, and that in the presence of A4′, A5′ implies A5
(A4′ is required to ensure that the two plausibilities values have a maximum). Thus,
any ranking is a rational measure. The opposite, however, is not true. It is easy
to verify that A4 and A5 do not imply A4′ and A5′. Thus, there is a discrepancy
between the properties that are necessary to satisfy C5 and those studied in the
literature. However, we now show that if we care only about defaults, then there is
no difference between rational structures and ranked (plausibility) structures , where
the plausibility measure is a ranking.
Theorem 8.4. If (W,Pl) be a rational qualitative plausibility space, then there
is a default-equivalent plausibility space (W,Pl′) such that Pl′ is a ranking.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Corollary 8.5. If PL = (W,P , π) is a rational plausibility structure, then there
is a ranked plausibility structure PL′ = (W,P ′, π) such that (PL, w) |= φ if and only
if (PL′, w) |= φ for all worlds w and formulas φ ∈ LC .
Conditional logic allows us to capture another property that we encountered
earlier. Recall that measures based on PPDs, possibility measures, and κ-rankings
are all normal , that is, that Pl(W ) > ⊥. This property corresponds to the axiom
C6. ¬(true→false).
It is not hard to show that C6 is valid in each of SPossc ,S
κ
c , and S
ǫ.
Using C5 and C6 we can characterize Sǫc , S
κ
c , and S
Poss
c .
Theorem 8.6. (a) C+{C6} is a sound and complete axiomatization of Sǫc .
(b) C +{C5, C6} is a sound and complete axiomatization of Sκc and S
Poss
c .
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
9. CONCLUSIONS
We feel that this paper makes three major contributions: the introduction of plau-
sibility measures, the unification of all earlier results regarding the KLM properties
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into one framework, and a general result showing the inevitability of these proper-
ties.
Do we really need plausibility measures? That depends on the language we are
interested in. If all we are interested in is propositional default reasoning and
the KLM properties, then, as is well known (and our results emphasize), many
different approaches turn out to be equivalent in expressive power. If we move
to the richer language of propositional conditional logic, then, as the results of
Section 8 show, we start to see some differences (that are captured by axioms
C5 and C6, which correspond to rationality and normality, respectively), although
plausibility structures and preferential structures continue to be characterized by
the same axioms. As we show in a companion paper [Friedman et al. 1996], once we
move to first-order conditional logic, more significant differences start to appear.
The extra expressive power of plausibility structures makes them more appropriate
than preferential structures for providing semantics for first-order default reasoning.
This difference is due to the fact when doing propositional reasoning, we can safely
restrict to finite structures. (Technically, this is because we have a finite model
property: if a formula in LC is satisfiable, it is satisfiable in a finite plausibility
structure; see Lemma A.9.) In finite structures, preferential orders and plausibility
measures are equi-expressive. The differences that we observe between them in
first-order conditional logic are due to the fact that in first-order reasoning, infinite
structures play a more important role.
Beyond their role in default reasoning, we expect that plausibility measures will
prove useful whenever we want to express uncertainty and do not want to (or
cannot) do so using probability. For example, we can easily define a plausibilistic
analogue of conditioning [Friedman and Halpern 1995]. While this can also be done
in many of the other approaches we have considered, we believe that the generality
of plausibility structures will allow us to again see what properties of independence
we need for various tasks. In particular, in [Friedman and Halpern 1996], we use
plausibilistic independence to define a plausibilistic analogue of Markov chains. In
future work we plan to explore further the properties and applications of plausibility
structures.
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APPENDIX
A. DETAILED PROOFS
A.1 Proofs for Section 4
Lemma 4.1. Let W be a set of possible worlds and let π be a function that maps
each world in W to a truth assignment to L. Let T ⊆ Ldef be a set of defaults that
is closed under the rules of system P that satisfies the following condition:
(∗) if φ→ψ ∈ T , [[φ]] = [[φ′]], and [[ψ]] = [[ψ′]], then φ′→ψ′ ∈ T , for all formulas
φ, φ′, ψ, ψ′ ∈ L.
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There is a plausibility structure PLT = (W,PlT , π) such that PlT ([[φ]]) ≤ PlT ([[ψ]])
if and only if φ ∨ ψ→ψ ∈ T . Moreover, PLT |= φ→ψ if and only if φ→ψ ∈ T .
Proof. We start by noting that the condition imposed on T ensures that PlT
is well defined, i.e., sets that are described by different formulas are compared in
a consistent manner. We now examine whether there exists a plausibility measure
(W,PlT ) satisfying (∗). It suffices to show that the order relation on PlT is reflexive,
transitive, and satisfies A1.
Reflexivity. Applying REF and LLE, we get that (φ ∨ φ)→φ ∈ T for all φ.
Transitivity. This is a direct consequence of the following lemma of Kraus, Lehmann
and Magidor.
Lemma A.1. [Kraus et al. 1990, Lemma 5.5] Let T be a set of defaults closed
under applications of the rules of system P. Then if both φ1 ∨ φ2→φ2 and φ2 ∨
φ3→φ3 are in T , then so is φ1 ∨ φ3→φ3.
A1. Assume [[φ]] ⊆ [[ψ]]. It follows that [[ψ]] = [[ψ ∨ φ]]. Since T is closed under
REF we get that (φ ∨ ψ)→(φ ∨ ψ) ∈ T . Using (∗), we get that (φ ∨ ψ)→ψ ∈ T .
Thus, PlT ([[φ]]) ≤ PlT ([[ψ]]).
Finally, we need to show that (W,PlT , π) |= φ→ψ if and only if φ→ψ ∈ T . We
start by observing that LLE, REF, and AND imply that φ→ψ ∈ T if and only if
(φ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ψ)→φ ∧ ψ ∈ T . We conclude that
(∗∗) φ→ψ ∈ T if and only if PlT ([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]) ≤ PlT ([[φ ∧ ψ]]).
Thus, it suffices to show that PlT ([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]) ≤ PlT ([[φ ∧ ψ]]) if and only if either
PlT ([[φ∧¬ψ]]) < PlT ([[φ∧ψ]]) or PlT ([[φ]]) = ⊥. The “if” direction is trivial. For the
“only if” direction, suppose by way of contradiction that we have PlT ([[φ]]) > ⊥,
PlT ([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]) ≤ PlT ([[φ ∧ ψ]]), and PlT ([[φ ∧ ψ]]) ≤ PlT ([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]). From (∗∗), we
have that φ→ψ ∈ T and φ→¬ψ ∈ T . By AND and (∗), we have that φ→false ∈ T .
But then PlT ([[φ]]) = ⊥, which contradicts our assumptions.
A.2 Proofs for Section 5
Theorem 5.2. If ∆ ⊢P′ φ→ψ, then ∆ |=SPL φ→ψ.
Proof. We need to show that LLE, RW, and REF are sound in SPL. Let
PL = (W,Pl, π) be a plausibility structure. We proceed as follows.
LLE. Assume that ⊢L φ ⇔ φ′. Then, by definition, [[φ]] = [[φ′]]. The soundness
of LLE immediately follows.
RW. Assume that ⊢L ψ ⇒ ψ
′ and that PL |= φ→ψ. We want to show that
PL |= φ→ψ′. If Pl([[φ]]) = ⊥, this is immediate. On the other hand, if Pl([[φ]]) > ⊥,
then Pl([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]) < Pl([[φ ∧ ψ]]). Since ⊢L ψ ⇒ ψ′ we have that [[ψ]] ⊆ [[ψ′]]. It
follows that [[φ ∧ ¬ψ′]] ⊆ [[φ ∧ ¬ψ]] and [[φ ∧ ψ]] ⊆ [[φ ∧ ψ′]]. Using A1, we conclude
that Pl([[φ ∧ ψ′]] > Pl([[φ ∧ ¬ψ′]], so PL |= φ→ψ′.
REF. By definition, [[φ ∧ ¬φ]] = ∅ and Pl(∅) = ⊥. Thus, if Pl([[φ]]) > ⊥, then
PL |= φ→φ. On the other hand, if Pl([[φ]]) = ⊥, then PL |= φ→φ vacuously.
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Proposition 5.3. A plausibility measure satisfies A2 if and only if it satisfies
A2′.
Proof. Let (W,Pl) be a plausibility space. Assume that Pl satisfies A2. Let A,
B1, and B2 be sets such that Pl(A∩B1) > Pl(A∩B1) and Pl(A∩B2) > Pl(A∩B2).
Set C = A∩B1∩B2, D = A∩B1∩B2, and E = A∩B1. It is easy to verify that C, D,
and E are pairwise disjoint. Since C∪D = A∩B1, we have that Pl(C∪D) > Pl(E).
Moreover, since C ∪E ⊇ A∩B2, D ⊆ A∩B2, and Pl(A∩B2) > Pl(A∩B2), we can
apply A1 and conclude that Pl(C ∪ E) > Pl(D). Applying A2, we conclude that
Pl(C) > Pl(D ∪ E), i.e., Pl(A ∩B1 ∩B2) > Pl(A ∩ (B1 ∩B2)). This gives us A2′.
Now assume that Pl satisfies A2′. Let C,D, and E be pairwise disjoint sets such
that Pl(C ∪D) > Pl(E) and Pl(C ∪E) > Pl(D). Let A = C ∪D ∪E, B1 = C ∪D,
and B2 = C ∪ E. Then we have Pl(A ∩ B1) = Pl(C ∪ D) > Pl(E) = Pl(A ∩ B1)
and Pl(A ∩ B2) = Pl(C ∪ E) > Pl(D) = Pl(A ∩ B2). From A2′, we have that
Pl(A∩B1∩B2) > Pl(A∩ (B1 ∩B2)), i.e., Pl(C) > Pl(D∪E). This gives us A2.
Theorem 5.4. P ⊆ SQPL if and only if for all ∆, φ, and ψ, if ∆ ⊢P φ→ψ,
then ∆ |=S φ→ψ.
Proof. To prove the “if” direction it suffices to show that each rule in system P
is sound in qualitative structures. Let PL = (W,Pl, π) be a qualitative plausibility
structure. The soundness of LLE, RW, and REF is proved in Theorem 5.2. To deal
with the remaining cases, we proceed as follows.
AND. Assume that PL |= φ→ψ1 and PL |= φ→ψ2. If Pl([[φ]]) = ⊥, then
PL |= φ→ψ1 ∧ ψ2 vacuously. Assume that Pl([[φ]]) > ⊥. Let A = [[φ]], B1 = [[ψ1]],
and B2 = [[ψ2]]. Since PL |= φ→ψ1 and PL |= φ→ψ2, we have that Pl(A ∩B1) >
Pl(A∩B1) and Pl(A∩B2) > Pl(A∩B2). Proposition 5.3 states that Pl satisfies A2′,
and thus we get that Pl(A ∩B1 ∩B2) > Pl(A ∩ (B1 ∩B2)), so PL |= φ→ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
CM. Again assume that PL |= φ→ψ1 and PL |= φ→ψ2. If Pl([[φ ∧ ψ1]]) = ⊥,
then PL |= φ ∧ ψ1→ψ2 vacuously. Assume that Pl([[φ ∧ ψ1]]) > ⊥. Let A,B1, and
B2 be defined as in the treatment of AND above. Again, we have Pl((A ∩ B1 ∩
B2) > Pl(A ∩ (B1 ∩B2)). Since A ∩ B1 ∩ B2 ⊆ A ∩ (B1 ∩B2), we conclude that
Pl(A ∩B1 ∩B2) > Pl(A ∩B1 ∩B2). Thus, PL |= φ ∧ ψ1→ψ2.
OR. Assume that PL |= φ1→ψ and PL |= φ2→ψ. If Pl([[φ1]]) = Pl([[φ2]]) = ⊥,
then applying A3 we get that Pl([[φ1 ∨ φ2]]) = ⊥ and thus PL |= (φ1 ∨ φ2)→ψ
vacuously. So assume that Pl([[φ1]]) > ⊥. (Identical argument works if Pl([[φ2]]) >
⊥.) Set A = [[(φ1∨φ2)∧ψ]], B = [[φ1∧¬ψ]], and C = [[φ2∧¬φ1∧¬ψ]]. To prove that
PL |= (φ1 ∨ φ2)→ψ, we must show that Pl(A) > Pl(B ∪ C). Since PL |= φ1→ψ,
we have that Pl(A) ≥ Pl([[φ1 ∧ ψ]]) > Pl(B). If Pl([[φ2]]) = ⊥, then Pl(C) = ⊥
and we conclude that Pl(A) > Pl(C). On the other hand, if Pl([[φ2]]) > ⊥, then
since PL |= φ2→ψ, we have Pl(A) ≥ Pl([[φ2 ∧ ψ]]) > Pl([[φ2 ∧ ¬ψ]]) ≥ Pl(C). From
A2, Pl(A) > Pl(B), and Pl(A) > Pl(C), we get that Pl(A) > Pl(B ∪ C). Thus,
PL |= (φ1 ∨ φ2)→ψ.
To prove the “only if” direction we have to show that if there is some PL =
(W,Pl, π) in S that is not qualitative, then the KLM properties are not sound with
respect to P . Assume that Pl does not satisfy A2. Since we have assumed that
F = {[[φ]] : φ ∈ L}, there are formulas φ, ψ1, and ψ2, such that [[φ]], [[ψ1]], and
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[[ψ2]] are pairwise disjoint, Pl([[φ ∨ ψ2]]) > Pl([[ψ1]]), Pl([[φ ∨ ψ1]]) > Pl([[ψ2]]), and
yet Pl([[φ]]) 6> Pl([[ψ1 ∧ ψ2]]). Thus, PL |= (φ ∨ ψ1 ∨ ψ2)→¬ψ1 and PL |= (φ ∨ ψ1 ∨
ψ2)→¬ψ2. However, PL 6|= (φ∨ψ1 ∨ψ2)→(¬ψ1 ∧¬ψ2). This shows that the AND
rule is not sound in S. Now assume that there is some PL = (W,Pl, π) that does not
satisfy A3. Thus, there are formulas φ1 and φ2 such that Pl([[φ1]]) = Pl([[φ2]]) = ⊥
and Pl([[φ1 ∨ φ2]]) > ⊥. We conclude that PL |= φ1→false and PL |= φ2→false,
but PL 6|= (φ1 ∨ φ2)→false. This shows that the OR rule is not sound in S.
Theorem 5.5. Each of SPoss, Sκ, Sǫ, Sp, and Sr is a subset of SQPL.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that A2 and A3 hold for each structure in
SPoss, Sκ, Sǫ, Sp, and Sr .
We start with SPoss. Let (W,Poss, π) be a possibility structure. To prove A2,
assume that A,B,C ⊆W are pairwise disjoint sets such that Poss(A∪B) > Poss(C)
and Poss(A ∪ C) > Poss(B). Since Poss(A ∪ B) = max(Poss(A),Poss(B)), we
have that max(Poss(A),Poss(B)) > Poss(C) and that max(Poss(A),Poss(C)) >
Poss(B). It easily follows that Poss(A) > max(Poss(B),Poss(C)) = Poss(B ∪ C),
as required by A2. To prove A3, suppose that Poss(A) = Poss(B) = 0. Since
Poss(A ∪B) = max(Poss(A),Poss(B)), we have that Poss(A ∪B) = 0, as required
by A3.
The proof for Sκ is identical (replacing max and 0 with min and∞, respectively).
Next, consider Sǫ. Let (W, {Pri}, π) be a PPD structure and let (W,PlPP , π)
be the corresponding structure in Sǫ. To prove A2, assume that A,B,C ⊆ W
are pairwise disjoint sets such that PlPP (A ∪ B) > PlPP (C) and PlPP (A ∪ C) >
PlPP (B). We want to show that PlPP (A) > PlPP (B ∪ C). According to the
construction of Theorem 4.2, we need to show that limi→∞ Pri(A | A∪B ∪C) = 1
and that limi→∞ Pri(B ∪ C | A ∪ B ∪ C) 6= 1 (the limit can be undefined in this
case). Since PlPP (A ∪B) > PlPP (C) and PlPP (A ∪ C) > PlPP (B), we have that
limi→∞ Pri(A ∪B | A ∪B ∪ C) = 1, limi→∞ Pri(A ∪C | A ∪B ∪ C) = 1 (3)
limi→∞ Pri(B | A ∪B ∪ C) 6= 1, limi→∞ Pri(C | A ∪B ∪ C) 6= 1 (4)
To prove that limi→∞ Pri(A | A ∪ B ∪ C) = 1, fix ǫ > 0. From (3), we have
that there is an nǫ such that for all i > nǫ, Pri(A ∪ B | A ∪ B ∪ C) > 1 −
ǫ
2 and
Pri(A∪C | A∪B∪C) > 1−
ǫ
2 . Let i > nǫ. There are two cases. If Pri(A∪B∪C) = 0,
then Pri(A | A ∪ B ∪ C) = 1 by definition. If Pri(A | A ∪ B ∪ C) > 0, we use the
disjointness of A, B, and C to get
Pri(A | A ∪B ∪ C) + Pri(B | A ∪B ∪ C) > 1−
ǫ
2
Pri(A | A ∪B ∪ C) + Pri(C | A ∪B ∪ C) > 1−
ǫ
2
This implies that Pri(A | A ∪B ∪C) + Pri(A ∪B ∪ C | A ∪B ∪ C) > 2− ǫ. Since
Pri(A∪B∪C | A∪B∪C) = 1, we get that Pri(A | A∪B∪C) > 1−ǫ. We conclude
that Pri(A | A∪B∪C) > 1−ǫ for all i > nǫ, and thus limi→∞ Pri(A | A∪B∪C) = 1.
To prove that limi→∞ Pri(B∪C | A∪B∪C) 6= 1, it suffices to find a subsequence
on which Pri(B ∪ C | A ∪ B ∪ C) → 0. Let i1, i2, . . . , ij , . . . be the sequence
of indexes such that Prij (A ∪ B ∪ C) > 0. This sequence must be infinite, for
otherwise, since Pri(B | A ∪ B ∪ C) = 1 whenever Pri(A ∪ B ∪ C) = 0, we would
have that limi→∞ Pri(B | A ∪B ∪C) = 1, contradicting (4). From limi→∞ Pri(A |
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A ∪ B ∪ C) = 1, we have that limj→∞ Prij (A | A ∪ B ∪ C) = 1. Moreover, since
Prij (B∪C | A∪B ∪C) = 1−Prij (A | A∪B ∪C), we get that limj→∞ Prij (B∪C |
A ∪B ∪ C) = 0. We conclude that limi→∞ Pri(B ∪ C | A ∪B ∪ C) 6= 1.
To prove A3, assume that A,B ⊆ W are such that PlPP (A) = PlPP (B) =
⊥. By the construction of Theorem 4.2, we have that PlPP (A) ≤⊥= PlPP (∅)
if limi→∞ Pri(∅ | A ∪ ∅) = 1. This implies that there is an index nA such that
Pri(A) = 0 for all i > nA. Similarly, there is an nB such that Pri(B) = 0 for
all i > nB. Hence, Pri(A ∪ B) = 0 for all i > max(nA, nB). We conclude that
PlPP (A ∪B) = ⊥.
Finally, we consider Sp and Sr . Let (W,≺, π) be a preference structure and
let (W,Pl≺, π) be the corresponding structure in Sp. To prove A2, assume that
A,B,C ⊆W are pairwise disjoint sets such that Pl≺(A∪B) > Pl≺(C) and Pl≺(A∪
C) > Pl≺(B). We want to show that Pl≺(A) > Pl≺(B ∪ C). It is easy to verify
that the construction of Theorem 4.2 is such that disjoint sets cannot have equal
plausibilities. Thus, it suffices to show that Pl≺(A) ≥ Pl≺(B ∪ C). That is, for
all w ∈ B ∪ C there is a world w′ ∈ A such that (a) w′ ≺ w and (b) there is no
w′′ ∈ B ∪ C such that w′′ ≺ w′. Let wBC ∈ B ∪ C. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that w ∈ B. Since Pl≺(A∪C) > Pl≺(B), there is a world wAC ∈ A∪C
such that wAC ≺ wBC and for all wB ∈ B, wB 6≺ wAC . There are three cases: (1)
If wAC ∈ C, then since Pl≺(A ∪B) > Pl≺(C), there is a world wAB ∈ A ∪B such
that wAB ≺ wAC and for all wC ∈ C, wC 6≺ wAB. Since wB 6≺ wAC for all wB ∈ B,
we get that wAB ∈ A. For requirement (a), by the transitivity of ≺ we have that
wAB ≺ wBC . For requirement (b), suppose that w′′ ∈ B ∪ C. If w′′ ∈ C, then we
have that w′′ 6≺ wAB. On the other hand, if w′′ ∈ B, then we have that w′′ 6≺ wAC ,
and by transitivity w′′ 6≺ wAB. (2) If wAC ∈ A and there is a world wC ∈ C such
that wC ≺ wAC , then since Pl≺(A ∪B) > Pl≺(C), there is a world wAB such that
wAB ≺ wC and for all worlds w′′ ∈ C, w′′ 6≺ wAB . Again, it follows that wAC ∈ A
and satisfies (a) and (b). Finally, (3) if wAC ∈ A and for all wC ∈ C, wC 6≺ wAC ,
then it is easy to check that wAC satisfies (a) and (b).
To prove A3, we note that the construction of Theorem 4.2 is such that Pl≺(A) =
⊥ if and only if A = ∅. A3 immediately follows.
Theorem 5.8. A set S of qualitative plausibility structures is rich if and only if
for all finite ∆ and defaults φ→ψ, we have that ∆ |=S φ→ψ implies ∆ ⊢P φ→ψ.
Proof. For the “if” direction, assume that S is not rich. We need to show that
system P is not complete for |=S . It is sufficient to construct ∆, φ, and ψ such that
∆ |=S φ→ψ but ∆ 6⊢P φ→ψ.
We start with a lemma, whose straightforward proof is left to the reader.
Lemma A.2. Let φ1, . . . , φn be a collection of mutually exclusive formulas. Let
∆ consist of the default φn→false and the defaults φi∨φj→φi for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
Then (W,Pl, π) |= ∆ if and only if there is some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that
Pl([[φ1]]) > Pl([[φ2]]) > · · · > Pl([[φj ]]) = · · · = Pl([[φn]]) = ⊥.
Since S is not rich, there is a collection φ1, . . . , φn that is a counterexample to
the definition of richness. Let ∆ be the set of defaults defined in Lemma A.2. We
claim that if (W,Pl, π) ∈ S satisfies all the defaults in ∆, then Pl([[φn−1]]) = ⊥. To
see this, assume that Pl([[φn−1]]) > ⊥. Then according to Lemma A.2, Pl([[φ1]]) >
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· · · > Pl([[φn−1]]) > Pl([[φn]]) = ⊥, but this contradicts the assumption that the
sequence φ1, . . . , φn is a counterexample to richness. Since Pl([[φn−1]]) = ⊥ in every
structure that satisfies ∆, we conclude that ∆ |=S φn−1→false.
We now show that ∆ 6⊢P φn−1→false. The easiest way of proving this is by
using Theorem 3.1. All we need to show is that there is a preferential structure
that satisfies ∆ but does not satisfies φn−1→false. Let W = {w1, . . . , wn−1}, let ≺
be such that wi ≺ wj for all i < j, and let π be such that π(wi)(φj) = true if and
only if i = j. It is straightforward to verify that (W,≺, π) satisfies ∆. However, it
easy to see that (W,≺, π) 6|= φn−1→false. This concludes the proof of “if” direction.
For the “only if” direction, assume that there is some ∆ and φ→ψ such that
∆ |=S φ→ψ but ∆ 6⊢P φ→ψ. Using Theorem 3.1 we get that ∆ 6|=p φ→ψ. Thus,
there is some preferential structure P = (W,≺, π) that satisfies the defaults in ∆
but not φ→ψ. In fact, as the following lemma shows, we can assume that P is a
linear structure.
Lemma A.3. [Friedman and Halpern 1994] Let ∆ be a finite set of defaults. If
there is a preferential structure that satisfies ∆ and does not satisfy φ→ψ, then there
is a preferential structure P = (W,≺, π) such that W = {w1, . . . , wn}, wi ≺ wj for
all i < j, P |= ∆ and P 6|= φ→ψ.
We now use P to construct a sequence of formulas that will be a counterexample
to the richness of S. Let p1, . . . , pm be the propositions that appear in ∆ and φ→ψ.
Since ∆ is finite, there is a finite number of such propositions. We note that whether
a default φ→ψ is satisfied in P depends only on the minimal world satisfying φ. If
π(wi) and π(wj) for some i < j agree on the truth of p1, . . . , pm, then wj cannot be
a minimal world for any formula defined using only p1 . . . pm. Thus, we can assume,
without loss of generality, that for all wi 6= wj , there is some pk that is assigned a
different truth value by each of the two worlds. We now construct formulas that
characterize the truth assignment to p1, . . . , pm in each world in W . Let
φi =
∧
{j:π(wi)(pj)=true}
pj ∧
∧
{j:π(wi)(pj)=false}
¬pj
for i = 1, . . . , n, and let φn+1 = ¬(φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φn). It is easy to verify that these
formulas are mutually exclusive.
We now claim that if PL is a plausibility structure where Pl([[φ1]]) > · · · >
Pl([[φn+1]]) = ⊥, then PL satisfies the defaults in ∆ but not φ→ψ. This will suffice
to prove that S is not rich, since if S contains such a structure we get a contradiction
to the assumption that ∆ |=S φ→ψ.
Let PL be a plausibility structure where Pl([[φ1]]) > · · · > Pl([[φn+1]]) = ⊥. We
want to show that PL |= ξ→ξ′ if and only if P |= ξ→ξ′, for all formulas ξ and ξ′
defined using only p1, . . . , pm.
Let ξ, ξ′ be formulas defined over p1, . . . , pm. Assume that P |= ξ→ξ′. There are
two cases: either (a) ξ is not satisfied in W , or (b) the minimal world satisfying ξ
also satisfies ξ′. In case (a), it is easy to see that ⊢L ξ ⇒ φn+1. From A1, we have
that Pl(ξ) = ⊥, and thus PL |= ξ→ξ′ vacuously. In case (b) assume that wi is the
minimal world satisfying ξ. Since P |= ξ→ξ′ we have that π(wi) |= ξ∧ξ′. A simple
argument shows that ⊢L φi ⇒ ξ ∧ ξ′. Thus, using A1, we get that Pl([[ξ ∧ ξ′]]) ≥
Pl([[φi]]). Since wi is the minimal world satisfying ξ and it also satisfies ξ
′, we have
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that ξ∧¬ξ′ is not satisfied by w1, . . . , wi. Since φ1, . . . , φn+1 are exhaustive, we have
that ⊢L (ξ∧¬ξ′)⇒ (φi+1∨. . .∨φn+1). Thus, Pl([[ξ∧¬ξ′]]) ≤ Pl([[φi+1∨. . .∨φn+1]]).
By repeated applications of A2 and the fact that Pl([[φi]]) > Pl([[φj ]]) for all j > i,
we get that Pl([[φi]]) > Pl[[ξ ∧ ¬ξ′]]). We conclude that Pl([[ξ ∧ ξ′]]) > Pl([[ξ ∧ ¬ξ′]])
and thus PL |= ξ→ξ′.
Now assume that P 6|= ξ→ξ′. Thus, there is a minimal world wi that satisfies ξ;
moreover, wi does not satisfy ξ
′. This implies that P |= ξ→¬ξ′ and Pl([[ξ]]) > ⊥.
Applying the proof in the previous paragraph, we have that Pl([[ξ ∧¬ξ′]]) > Pl([[ξ ∧
ξ′]]), and thus PL 6|= ξ→ξ′.
A.3 Proofs for Section 6
We now prove Theorem 6.3. We start with two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma A.4. Let (W,F ,Pl) be a normal qualitative plausibility space such that F
is finite, let A∗, B∗ ∈ F be disjoint sets such that Pl(A∗) 6< Pl(B∗), and let x ≥ 2.
Then there is a probability measure Pr over W such that Pr(B∗|A∗ ∪ B∗) ≤ 12 ;
moreover if Pl(A) < Pl(B) then Pr(B|A∪B) ≥ 1− 1
x
, for all disjoint sets A,B ∈ F .
Proof. Let A1, . . . , An be the atoms of F , i.e., each Ai 6= ∅ is in F and there
is no nonempty B ∈ F such that B ⊂ Ai. Since F is finite, every set in F is a
disjoint union of atoms.
We can describe Pl using a set of defaults. Let p1, . . . , pn be a collection of distinct
propositions. For each set A ∈ F we define φA =
∨
Ai⊆A
pi if A is nonempty, and
define φA = false if A is empty. Let
∆ = {(φA ∨ φB)→φB : A,B ∈ F , A ∩B = ∅,Pl(A) < Pl(B)} ∪
{(pi ∧ pj)→false : i 6= j} ∪
{¬(p1 ∨ . . . ∨ pn)→false}.
Let π be a truth assignment to W such that π(w)(pi) = true if and only if
w ∈ Ai. Then it is easy to check that PL = (W,F ,Pl, π) satisfies ∆ and PL 6|=
(φA∗ ∨φB∗)→φB∗ . Since Pl is a qualitative plausibility measure by assumption, we
have that PL ∈ SQPL. Using Theorem 5.8, we get that ∆ 6⊢P (φA∗ ∨ φB∗)→φB∗ .
By Theorem 3.1, there is a preferential structure P = (WP ,≺, πP ) such that P
satisfies ∆ but P 6|= (φA∗ ∨ φB∗)→φB∗ . Applying Lemma A.3 we can assume that
P is linear, i.e., WP = {v1, . . . , vm} for some m ≤ n, and ≺ is such that vi ≺ vj
if i < j. Moreover, we have that WP not empty: Since PL is normal, we have
that PL 6|= true→false. Hence, P 6|= true→false, which implies that there are some
minimal worlds that satisfy true.
We now construct the required probability measure over W . We start by not-
ing that the defaults in ∆ imply that for each world vi, πP (vi) assigns true to
exactly one proposition. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that
πP (vi)(pj) =true if and only if i = j. We define Pr by assigning a probabil-
ity to each atom. The probability of all other sets is induced from this assign-
ment: Pr(A) =
∑
Ai⊆A
Pr(Ai), for all A ∈ F . Let Ai be an atom. We define
Pr(Ai) = α · (
1
x
)i, if i ≤ m; otherwise we define Pr(Ai) = 0. The constant α is a
normalization constant that ensures that the probability of atoms sum to 1. It is
easy to verify that α = (x− 1) x
m
xm−1 .
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We now show that Pr satisfies the requirements of the lemma. Assume that
A,B ∈ F are disjoint and Pl(A) < Pl(B). We want to show that Pr(B|A ∪ B) ≥
1 − 1
x
. By definition, (φA ∨ φB)→φB ∈ ∆, and thus P |= (φA ∨ φB)→φB. There
are two cases: either (a) there is no world in WP that satisfies (φA ∨φB) or (b) the
minimal world that satisfies (φA ∨φB) also satisfies φB . In case (a), it immediately
follows that if Ai ⊆ A ∪ B, then i > m. We conclude that Pr(A) = Pr(B) = 0.
Thus, Pr(B|A ∪ B) = 1. (Recall that if Pr(A ∪ B) = 0 then, by convention,
Pr(B|A ∪ B) = 1.) In case (b), assume that vi is the minimal world satisfying
φA ∨ φB . Since P |= (φA ∨ φB)→φB, it must be the case that vi satisfies φB. This
implies that Pr(B) ≥ Pr(Ai). Since vi is the minimal world that satisfies φA ∨ φB ,
and since vi does not satisfy φB (since A and B are disjoint) we conclude that
Pr(A) ≤
∑
j>i Pr(Aj). Simple calculation show that
∑
j>i Pr(Aj) ≤ Pr(Ai) ·
1
x−1 .
Thus, (x−1)Pr(A) ≤ Pr(Ai) ≤ Pr(B). This implies that (x−1)(Pr(A)+Pr(B)) ≤
xPr(B). Since A and B are disjoint, we have that Pr(A ∪ B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B).
We get that (x− 1)Pr(A ∪B) ≤ xPr(B), so Pr(B|A ∪B) ≥ x−1
x
.
Finally we have to show that Pr(B∗|A∗∪B∗) ≤ 12 . Since P 6|= (φA∗ ∨φB∗)→φB∗ ,
the minimal world, vi, satisfying φA∗ ∨ φB∗ does not satisfy φB∗ . Since A
∗ and
B∗ are disjoint, this implies that vi satisfies φA∗ . The argument above shows that
Pr(A∗|A∗ ∪B∗) ≥ 1− 1
x
and Pr(A∗ ∪B∗) > 0. Therefore, Pr(B∗|A∗ ∪B∗) ≤ 1
x
≤
1
2 .
Lemma A.5. Let (W,F ,Pl) be a normal qualitative plausibility space such that
F is finite. Then there is a PPD PP = {Prn : n ≥ 1} such that, for all disjoint
A,B ∈ F ,
—if Pl(A) < Pl(B), then Prn(B|A ∪B) ≥ 1−
1
n+1 for all n,
—if Pl(A) 6< Pl(B), then for all n, there is an m such that n ≤ m < n+ |F|2 and
Prm(B|A ∪B) ≤
1
2 .
Proof. Let A0, . . . , A|F|−1 be some enumeration of the members of F . We
define the PPD PP = {Prn : n ≥ 1} as follows. For each n ≥ 1 we define in, jn to
be the unique integers such that n = k · |F|2+ in · |F|+ jn for some positive integer
k. According to Lemma A.4 there exists a probability distribution Prn on W such
that if Pl(A) < Pl(B), then Prn(B|A∪B) ≥ 1−
1
n+1 , for all disjoint sets A,B ∈ F .
Moreover, if Pl(Ain) 6< Pl(Ajn), we can ensure that Prn(Ajn |Ain ∪ Ajn) ≤
1
2 . It is
easy to verify that this PPD satisfies the requirements of lemma.
Theorem 6.3. If PL ∈ SQPL is a normal plausibility structure for a countable
language L, then there is a structure PL′ ∈ Sǫ that is default-equivalent to PL.
Proof. Let PL = (W,F ,Pl, π) be a normal qualitative plausibility for a count-
able language L. Since L is countable, so is F = {[[φ]] : φ ∈ L}. Let A1, A2, . . . be
an enumeration of the sets in F . Without loss of generality, we can assume that
A1 = W . Since Pl is normal, we must have Pl(A1) > ⊥. For each k, let Fk be
the minimal algebra that contains A1, . . . , Ak. Clearly, Fk is a finite algebra, and
Pl restricted to Fk is normal. Thus, there is a PPD PP k = {Pr
k
1 ,Pr
k
2 , . . .} that
satisfies the conditions of Lemma A.5.
We now use elements of these sequences to construct the desired PPD. We define
PP to be the sequence that consists of a segment of PP 1, followed by a segment
30 · Nir Friedman and Joseph Y. Halpern
of PP 2, and so on, such that the length of the segment from PP k is |Fk|2:
{Pr11, . . . ,Pr
1
1+|F1|2−1,Pr
2
2, . . . ,Pr
2
2+|F2|2−1, . . . ,Pr
k
k, . . . ,Pr
k
k+|Fk|2−1, . . .}.
To show that the plausibility measure that corresponds to (W,PP, π) is default-
equivalent to PL we need to show that for all disjoint Ai, Aj ∈ F , Pl(Ai) < Pl(Aj)
if and only if limn→∞ Prn(Aj |Ai ∪Aj) = 1.
Assume that Pl(Ai) < Pl(Aj). Let ǫ > 0. Set mǫ = max(i, j, ⌈
1
ǫ
⌉), and Nǫ =∑mǫ
k=1 |Fk|
2. Let n > Nǫ. Then our construction is such that Prn = Pr
k
l for some
l ≥ k ≥ mǫ. Since k ≥ max(i, j), we have that Ai, Aj ∈ Fk. Moreover, according
to Lemma A.5, Prkl (Aj |Ai ∪Aj) ≥ 1−
1
l+1 ≥ 1−
1
mǫ+1
≥ 1− ǫ. Thus, we conclude
that limn→∞ Prn(Aj |Ai ∪ Aj) = 1.
Assume that Pl(Ai) 6< Pl(Aj). Let k > max(i, j). According to Lemma A.5,
there is anm such that k ≤ m < k+|Fk|2 such that Pr
k
m(Aj |Ai∪Aj) ≤
1
2 . Moreover,
by the our construction, there is an n such that Prn = Pr
k
m. Thus, for infinitely
many n, Prn(Aj |Ai ∪Aj) ≤
1
2 . We conclude that limn→∞ Prn(Aj |Ai ∪Aj) 6= 1.
A.4 Proofs for Section 7
Proposition 7.2. If E is an expectation structure, then PLE is a plausibility
structure. Furthermore, E |= φ→ψ if and only if PLE |= φ→ψ.
Proof. SupposeE = (L,✂) is an expectation structure, and PLE = (WE ,PlE , πE).
To show that PLE is a plausibility structure, we need to check that the ordering
defined by PlE is reflexive, transitive, and satisfies A1. Note that it is easy to show,
using standard arguments, that [[φ]] ⊆ [[ψ]] if and only if ⊢L φ⇒ ψ. The proof that
PLE is plausibility measure follows in a straightforward manner and is left as an
exercise to the reader.
We now show that E |= φ→ψ if and only if PLE |= φ→ψ. Assume that E |=
φ→ψ. According to Theorem 7.1 there are two possible cases: either (a) ⊢L φ⇒ ψ
or (b) (φ⇒ ¬ψ)✁ (φ⇒ ψ). In case (a), we apply REF and RW (which are valid in
all plausibility structures) to get that PLE |= φ→ψ. Now consider case (b). It is
clear that true 6✂(φ⇒ ¬ψ), for if true✂ (φ⇒ ¬ψ), then true✁ (φ⇒ ψ) by E1. We
also have (φ⇒ ψ)✂ true by using E2, so by E1 again, we get that true✁ true, which
is a contradiction. Since true 6✂(φ⇒ ¬ψ) and (φ ⇒ ¬ψ) ✁ (φ ⇒ ψ), by definition,
we have that PlE([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]) ≤ PlE([[φ ∧ ψ]]). Moreover, since true 6✂(φ ⇒ ¬ψ),
we have that φ ∧ ψ is consistent. Thus, 6⊢L φ ∧ ψ ⇒ φ ∧ ¬ψ. Furthermore, since
(φ ⇒ ¬ψ) ✁ (φ ⇒ ψ), we also have that (φ ⇒ ψ) 6✁(φ ⇒ ¬ψ). This implies, by
definition, that PlE([[φ∧¬ψ]]) 6≥ PlE([[φ∧ψ]]). Hence, PlE([[φ∧¬ψ]]) < PlE([[φ∧ψ]]),
and so PLE |= φ→ψ.
Now assume that PLE |= φ→ψ. If ⊢L φ ⇒ ψ, then E |= φ→ψ. Assume that
6⊢L φ⇒ ψ. This implies that φ∧¬ψ is consistent in L. We claim that PlE([[φ]]) > ⊥.
To see this, assume that PlE([[φ]] ≤ Pl([[false]]). Since true✂ ¬false, the definition
of PlE implies that ⊢L φ ⇒ false. But this contradict the assumption that φ is
consistent in L. We conclude that PlE([[φ]]) > ⊥, and thus since PLe |= φ→ψ,
PlE([[φ ∧ ψ]]) > PlE([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]). It is straightforward to show that since φ ∧ ¬ψ is
consistent in L, we get that ¬(φ∧ψ)✁¬(φ∧¬ψ). Rewriting this equation, we get
that (φ⇒ ¬ψ)✁ (φ⇒ ψ), and thus E |= φ→ψ.
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A.5 Proofs for Section 8
We now want to prove Theorem 8.2. For the proof, it is useful to define Nφ as an
abbreviation for ¬φ→false. (The N operator is called the outer modality in [Lewis
1973].) Expanding the definition of →, we get that Nφ holds at w if and only if
Pl([[¬φ]]) =⊥. Thus, Nφ holds if ¬φ is considered completely implausible. Thus,
it implies that φ is true “almost everywhere”. The following lemma collects some
properties of N that will be needed in the proof.
Lemma A.6. (a) ⊢C N(φ ∧ ψ)⇒ Nφ.
(b) ⊢C (Nφ ∧Nψ)⇒ N(φ ∧ ψ).
(c) ⊢C (Nφ ∧N(φ⇒ ψ))⇒ Nψ.
(d) If ⊢C φ then ⊢C Nφ.
(e) ⊢C Nφ⇒ (ψ→φ).
(f) ⊢C (N(φ⇔ φ′) ∧N(ψ ⇔ ψ′))⇒ ((φ→ψ)⇔ (φ′→ψ′)).
Proof. Recall that Nφ is defined as ¬φ→false.
We start with part (a).
1. ⊢C (¬(φ ∧ ψ)→false)⇒ (¬(φ ∧ ψ)→¬φ) RC2
2. ⊢C (¬(φ ∧ ψ)→false)⇒ ((¬(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬φ)→false) 1, C4
3. ⊢C (¬(φ ∧ ψ)→false)⇒ (¬φ→false) 2, RC1
4. ⊢C N(φ ∧ ψ)⇒ Nφ 3 rewritten
To prove part (b), we proceed as follows:
1. ⊢C ((¬φ→false) ∧ (¬ψ→false))⇒ ((¬φ ∨ ¬ψ)→false) C3
2. ⊢C ((¬φ→false) ∧ (¬ψ→false))⇒ (¬(φ ∧ ψ)→false) 1, RC1
3. ⊢C (Nφ ∧Nψ)⇒ N(φ ∧ ψ) 2 rewritten
For part (c), we proceed as follows:
1. ⊢C (Nφ ∧N(φ⇒ ψ))⇒ N(φ ∧ (φ⇒ ψ)) (b)
2. ⊢C (Nφ ∧N(φ⇒ ψ))⇒ N(φ ∧ ψ) 1, RC1
3. ⊢C (Nφ ∧N(φ⇒ ψ))⇒ Nψ (a), 2
To prove part (d), we assume that ⊢C φ.
1. ⊢C φ assumption
2. ⊢C true⇔ φ 1, C0
3. ⊢C false→false C1
4. ⊢C ¬φ→false 3, RC1
To prove part (e), we proceed as follows:
1. ⊢C (ψ ∧ φ)→φ C1, RC2
2. ⊢C (¬φ→false)⇒ (¬φ→φ) ∧ (¬φ→ψ) RC2
3. ((¬φ→φ) ∧ (¬φ→ψ))⇒ ((ψ ∧ ¬φ)→φ C4
4. ⊢C (((ψ ∧ φ)→φ) ∧ ((ψ ∧ ¬φ)→φ)))⇒ (ψ→φ) C3, RC1
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5. ⊢C Nφ⇒ (ψ→φ) 1, 2, 3, 4
Finally, we prove part (f).
1. ⊢C N(φ⇔ φ′)⇒ (N(φ′ ⇒ φ) ∧N(φ⇒ φ′)) (a)
2. ⊢C N(φ′ ⇒ φ)⇒ ((φ′ ∧ ¬φ)→ψ) definition of N , RC2
3. ⊢C N(φ⇒ φ′)⇒ (φ→(φ⇒ φ′)) (e)
4. ⊢C N(φ⇒ φ′)⇒ (φ→φ′) 3, C1, C2, RC2
5. ⊢C (φ→φ′) ∧ (φ→ψ)⇒ ((φ′ ∧ φ)→ψ) C4
6. ⊢C N(φ⇔ φ′) ∧ (φ→ψ)⇒ (φ′→ψ) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, C3, RC1
7. ⊢C N(ψ ⇔ ψ′)⇒ (φ′→(ψ ⇒ ψ′)) (e), RC2
8. ⊢C N(φ⇔ φ′) ∧N(ψ ⇔ ψ′) ∧ (φ→ψ)⇒ (φ′→ψ′) 6, 7, C2, RC2
Theorem 8.2. System C is a sound and complete axiomatization of LC with
respect to SQPLc .
Proof. It is easy to verify that System C is sound in SQPLc . To prove complete-
ness, we have to show that if |=SQPLc φ, then ⊢C φ. This is equivalent to showing
that if 6⊢C φ (i.e., ¬φ is consistent) then 6|=SQPLc φ (i.e., ¬φ is satisfiable).
We construct a canonical qualitative plausibility structure PL such that for all
ξ ∈ LC we have that if ξ is consistent, then (PL, w) |= ξ for some world w, using
standard techniques. Recall that a set of formulas V ⊆ LC is a maximal ⊢C-
consistent set if it is consistent with respect to ⊢C and for each φ ∈ LC , either
φ ∈ V or ¬φ ∈ V . Let V be a set of formulas. We define V/N = {φ : Nφ ∈ V }.
Define PL = (W,P , π) as follows:
—W = {wV : V ⊆ LC is a maximal ⊢C-consistent set of formulas },
—P(wV ) = (Ww,F ,PlwV ) where
—WwV = {wU : V/N ⊆ U},
—FwV = {[φ]wV : φ ∈ L
C}, where [φ]wV = {wU ∈WwV : φ ∈ U},
—PlwV is such that PlwV ([φ]wV ) ≤ PlwV ([ψ]wV ) if and only if (φ ∨ ψ)→ψ ∈ V ,
—π(wV )(p) = true if and only if p ∈ V .
We want to show that PL is a qualitative plausibility structure and that (PL, wV ) |=
φ if and only if φ ∈ V for all formulas φ and worlds wV .
We first need to establish that PlwV is well-defined, for all wV ∈ W . Let V
be a maximal ⊢C-consistent set. We need to show that if [φ]wV = [φ
′]wV and
[ψ]wV = [ψ
′]wV , then (φ ∨ ψ)→ψ ∈ V if and only (φ
′ ∨ ψ′)→ψ′ ∈ V .
We claim that [φ]wV = [φ
′]wV if and only if V/N ∪ {¬(φ ⇔ φ
′)} is inconsistent.
The “if” direction is obvious. For the “only if” direction, assume that V/N∪{¬(φ⇔
φ′)} is consistent. This implies that there is a maximal consistent set U such that
∆ ∪ {¬(φ ⇔ φ′)} ⊆ U . Clearly, wU is in the symmetric difference between [φ]wV
and [φ′]wV . Thus, [φ]wV 6= [φ
′]wV .
Now assume that [φ]wV = [φ
′]wV and [ψ]wV = [ψ
′]wV . Therefore, as we have just
shown, V/N ∪ {¬(φ ⇔ φ′)} and V/N ∪ {¬(ψ ⇔ ψ)} are both inconsistent. Thus,
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there exists a formula δ which is the conjunction of a finite number of formulas in
V/N such that ⊢C δ ⇒ (φ ⇔ φ′) ∧ (ψ ⇔ ψ). Using part (b) of Lemma A.6, and
the fact that if φ ∈ V/N , then Nφ ∈ V , we get that Nδ ∈ V . From parts (c) and
(d) of Lemma A.6, we get that ⊢C Nδ ⇒ N(φ⇔ φ′) ∧N(ψ ⇔ ψ′). Finally, using
part (f) of Lemma A.6 we get that
⊢C Nδ ⇒ ((φ→ψ)⇔ (φ
′→ψ′)).
Thus, φ→ψ ∈ V if and only if φ′→ψ′ ∈ V . This suffices to prove that PlwV is
well-defined.
To see that PL is a qualitative plausibility structure, first note that the definition
of PlwV mirrors the construction in Lemma 4.1. It is easy to prove that the set of
defaults {φ→ψ ∈ V } is closed under the KLM rules. Thus, we can immediately
use the proof of Lemma 4.1 to show that (WwV ,PlwV ) is a plausibility space. The
proof that PL satisfies A2 and A3 is identical to the proof of Theorem 5.4. Thus,
PL ∈ SQPLc .
We next show that (PL, wV ) |= φ if and only if φ ∈ V . This is done by induction
on the structure of φ. The only case of interest is if φ is of the form φ′→ψ. Here
again the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 4.1. The only difference is the
use of axioms in system C instead of the corresponding rules in system P.
Let ξ be a ⊢C-consistent formula. Using standard arguments, it is easy to
show that there is some maximal ⊢C-consistent set Vξ such that ξ ∈ Vξ. Thus,
(PL, wVξ) |= ξ, so ξ is satisfiable in S
QPL
c .
Proposition 8.3. Let P ⊆ SQPLc . C5 is valid in S if and only if all structures
in S are rational.
Proof. To prove the “if” direction it suffices to show that C5 is sound in rational
qualitative structures. Let PL = (W,P , π) be a rational qualitative plausibility
structure. Assume that (PL, w) |= (φ→ψ) and (PL, w) |= ¬(φ ∧ ξ→ψ). We
need to prove that (PL, w) |= φ→¬ξ. If Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) = ⊥, then (PL, w) |=
φ→¬ξ vacuously, and we are done. Now assume that Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) > ⊥. Let
A = [[φ]](PL,w), B = [[ψ]](PL,w), and C = [[ξ]](PL,w). Since (PL, w) |= φ→ψ, we
have that Plw(A ∩ B) > Plw(A ∩ B). Since Plw satisfies A5, we have that either
Plw(A ∩ B ∩ C) > Plw(A ∩ B) or Plw(A ∩ B ∩ C) > Plw(A ∩ B). However, since
(PL, w) |= ¬(φ ∧ ξ→ψ), we have that Plw(A ∩ B ∩ C) 6> Plw(A ∩ B ∩ C). This
implies that
Plw(A ∩B ∩ C) 6> Plw(A ∩B). (5)
Thus, we conclude that
Plw(A ∩B ∩ C) > Plw(A ∩B). (6)
Applying A4 with (6) as the antecedent, we get that either Plw(A ∩ B ∩ C) >
Plw(A∩B) or Plw(A∩B ∩C) > Plw(A∩B ∩C). Since the former contradicts (5),
we conclude that Plw(A∩B ∩C) > Plw(A∩B ∩C). Using A1, A2, and (6), we get
that Plw(A ∩ C) ≥ Plw(A ∩B ∩ C) > Plw((A ∩B ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩B)) ≥ Plw(A ∩ C).
Thus, (PL, w) |= φ→¬ξ.
To prove the “only if” direction, we have to show that if there is some PL =
(W,P , π) in S that is not rational, then C5 is violated.
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Suppose that PL does not satisfy A4. Since we have assumed that Fw =
{[[φ]](PL,w) : φ ∈ L}, there is a world w, and formulas φ, ψ, and ξ such that [[φ]](PL,w),
[[ψ]](PL,w), and [[ξ]](PL,w) are pairwise disjoint, Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) > Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)), and
yet Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)) 6> Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)) and Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)) 6< Plw([[φ]](PL,w)). Since
Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) > Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)), we have that Plw([[φ∨ξ]](PL,w)) > Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)).
Thus, (PL, w) |= (φ∨ψ∨ξ)→¬ψ. Moreover, since Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)) 6< Plw([[φ]](PL,w)),
we have that Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)) > ⊥. Since we also have that Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)) 6>
Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)), we conclude that (PL, w) |= ¬((ξ∨ψ)→¬ψ). Finally, since Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) 6>
Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)), we have that Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) 6> Plw([[ξ∨ψ]](PL,w)). Thus, (PL, w) |=
¬((φ ∨ ψ ∨ ξ)→¬(ψ ∨ ξ)). Define α as φ ∨ ψ ∨ ξ, β as ψ ∨ ξ and γ as ¬ψ. We have
just proved that (PL, w) |= (α→γ) ∧ ¬(α→¬β) ∧ ¬(α ∧ β→γ), which contradicts
C5.
Now suppose that PL does not satisfy A5. Then there is a world w, and formu-
las φ, ψ, and ξ, such that [[φ]](PL,w), [[ψ]](PL,w), and [[ξ]](PL,w) are pairwise disjoint,
Plw([[φ ∨ ψ]](PL,w)) > Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)), and yet Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) 6> Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)) and
Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)) 6> Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)). Since Plw([[φ ∨ ψ]](PL,w)) > Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)) ≥ ⊥,
either Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) > ⊥ or Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)) > ⊥, for otherwise, using A3 we
would get that Plw([[φ ∨ ψ]](PL,w)) = ⊥. Without loss of generality, we assume
that Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) > ⊥. Since Plw([[φ ∨ ψ]](PL,w)) > Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)), we have
that (PL, w) |= (φ ∨ ψ ∨ ξ)→¬ξ. Since Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) > ⊥ and Plw([[φ]](PL,w)) 6>
Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)), we have that (PL, w) |= ¬((φ∨ξ)→¬ξ). Finally, since Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)) 6>
Plw([[ξ]](PL,w)), we have that Plw([[ψ]](PL,w)) 6> Plw([[φ∨ξ]](PL,w)), and thus (PL, w) |=
¬((φ ∨ ψ ∨ ξ)→ψ)). Define α as φ ∨ ψ ∨ ξ, β as ¬ψ and γ as ¬ξ. We have proved
that (PL, w) |= (α→γ) ∧ ¬(α→¬β)¬(α ∧ β→γ), which contradicts C5.
We next want to prove Theorem 8.4. We first need a lemma.
Lemma A.7. Let (W,Pl) be a qualitative plausibility space, and let <∗ be a binary
relation on subsets of W such that A <∗ B if there is some set C ⊆ W such that
A ∩ C = ∅ and Pl(A) < Pl(C) ≤ Pl(B). Then
(a) <∗ is a strict order; that is irreflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric,
(b) if A ∩B = ∅, then A <∗ B if and only if Pl(A) < Pl(B),
(c) if Pl is rational, then <∗ is modular, and
(d) if Pl is rational and A <∗ (A ∪B), then B 6<∗ (A ∪B).
Proof. We start with part (a). The definition of <∗ implies that A <∗ B only
if Pl(A) < Pl(B). Thus, we get that <∗ is irreflexive and anti-symmetric. We now
show that <∗ is transitive. Assume that A <∗ B and B <∗ C. Since A <∗ B,
there is a set D such that A ∩ D = ∅, and Pl(A) < Pl(D) ≤ Pl(B). Moreover,
since B <∗ C, we have that Pl(B) < Pl(C). Thus, we get that Pl(D) < Pl(C), and
hence A <∗ C.
For part (b), let A and B be disjoint sets. If Pl(A) < Pl(B), then A <∗ B using
the set C = B. On the other hand, if A <∗ B, then Pl(A) < Pl(B).
For part (c), assume that Pl is rational, and that A <∗ B. Let C ⊆ W . We
have to show that either A <∗ C or C <∗ B. Since A <∗ B, there is a set D
such that A ∩ D = ∅ and Pl(A) < Pl(D) ≤ Pl(B). Since D is the disjoint union
of (D ∩ C) and D − C, we can apply A5 and get that either Pl(A) < Pl(D ∩ C)
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or Pl(A) < Pl(D − C). If Pl(A) < Pl(D ∩ C), then since Pl(D ∩ C) ≤ Pl(C),
we get that A <∗ C and we are done. If Pl(A) < Pl(D − C), since A, D − C
and C −A are pairwise disjoint, we get from A4 that either Pl(A) < Pl(C −A) or
Pl(C−A) < Pl(D−C). If Pl(A) < Pl(C−A), we again get that A <∗ C and we are
done. If Pl(C−A) < Pl(D−C), using A2, we get that Pl((C−A)∪A) < Pl(D−C).
We conclude that Pl(C) < Pl(D − C). Since Pl(D − C) ≤ Pl(D) ≤ Pl(B), we get
that C <∗ B.
Finally, we prove part (d). Assume that A <∗ (A∪B). Without loss of generality,
we can also assume that B ∩A = ∅ (if not, replace B by B−A). We want to show
that B 6<∗ (A ∪ B). By way of contradiction, assume that B <∗ (A ∪ B). Since
A <∗ B, there is a set C such that A ∩ C = ∅ and Pl(A) < Pl(C) ≤ Pl(A ∪ B).
Since C ⊆ (C − B) ∪ B, this implies that Pl(A) < Pl((C − B) ∪ B). Since A, B,
and C −B are pairwise disjoint, we can apply A5 to get that either Pl(A) < Pl(B)
or Pl(A) < Pl(C − B). If Pl(A) < Pl(B), since we assumed that B <∗ (A ∪ B),
there is a set D such that D∩B = ∅ and Pl(B) < Pl(D) ≤ Pl(A∪B). This implies
that Pl(B) < Pl((D − A) ∪ B). Moreover, since Pl(A) < Pl(B), we also have that
Pl(A) < Pl((D−A)∪B). Since A, B and D−A are pairwise disjoint, we can apply
A2 to get that Pl(A∪B) < Pl(D−A) ≤ Pl(D). But this contradicts the assumption
that Pl(D) ≤ Pl(A∪B). If Pl(A) < Pl(C−B), since A, B, and C−B are pairwise
disjoint, we have by A4 that either Pl(A) < Pl(B) or Pl(B) < Pl(C − B). We
have already seen that if Pl(A) < Pl(B) we get a contradiction. Now assume that
Pl(B) < Pl(C − B). Then, since we also have that Pl(A) < Pl(C − B), we can
apply A2 to get that Pl(A ∪ B) < Pl(C − B) ≤ Pl(C). But this contradicts our
assumption that Pl(C) ≤ Pl(A ∪B). Thus, we must have B 6<∗ (A ∪B).
Theorem 8.4. If (W,Pl) be a rational qualitative plausibility space, then there
is a default-equivalent plausibility space (W,Pl′) such that Pl′ is a ranking.
Proof. Let <∗ be the relation defined in Lemma A.7. Define a relation ≈∗
on sets such that A ≈∗ B if neither A <∗ B nor B <∗ A. Since <∗ is modular,
standard (and straightforward) arguments show that ≈∗ is an equivalence relation.
We construct a new plausibility measure based on these two ordering. Let F/≈∗
be the set of equivalence classes of measurable sets. Let ≤∗ be the the total order
on F/ ≈∗ induced by <∗. Let Pl′ be a plausibility measure on F whose range is
F/ ≈∗, defined so that Pl′(A) = [A] where [A] is the equivalence class containing
A. We have to show that Pl′ is a plausibility measure. Assume that A ⊆ B.
Then Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B) and clearly B 6<∗ A. Thus, either A <∗ B or A ≈∗ B. We
conclude that Pl′(A) ≤ Pl′(B), as desired. Since ≤∗ is a total order, Pl′ satisfies
A4′. Using Lemma A.7(d), we get that Pl′(A ∪ B) = max(Pl′(A),Pl′(B)). Thus,
Pl′ also satisfies A5′, and hence is a ranking. Finally, we have to show that (W,Pl′)
is default-equivalent to (W,Pl). Let A and B be disjoint events. By Lemma A.7,
A <∗ B if and only if Pl(A) < Pl(B). Thus, we conclude that Pl′(A) < Pl′(B) if
and only if Pl(A) < Pl(B).
We now prove Theorem 8.4. We actually prove some more general results. Con-
sider the following two restrictions on plausibility structures:
R. Plw is rational for all worlds w.
N. Plw in normal for all worlds w.
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Theorem A.8. Let φ ∈ LC , let A be a subset of {R, N}, and let A be the
corresponding subset of {C5, C6}. Then φ is valid in subset of SQPLc that satisfies
A if and only if φ is provable from system C+A.
Proof. Again, we focus on completeness. We obtain completeness in each case
by modifying the proof of Theorem 8.2. We construct a canonical model as in
that proof, checking consistency with the extended axiom system. The resulting
structure has the property that (PL, wV ) |= φ if and only if φ ∈ V . We just need
to show that this structure also satisfies the corresponding semantic restrictions.
If C5 is included as an axiom, then C5 is valid in PL. Using Proposition 8.3 we
get that PL is rational.
If C6 is included as an axiom and PL is not normal, then there is some world
wV where PlwV ([[true]](PL,wV )) = PlwV ([[false]](PL,wV )). We get that (PL, wV ) |=
true→false, which contradicts C6.
Lemma A.9. Let φ ∈ LC and let A be a subset of {R, N}. If φ is satisfiable in
a structure satisfying A, it is satisfiable in a finite structure satisfying A.
Proof. Let φ ∈ LC and let PL = (W,P , π) be a structure satisfying A such
that (PL, w) |= φ for some w ∈ W . We now construct a finite structure PL′ that
satisfies φ. The key idea is that when evaluating φ we only examine subformulas of
φ. Thus, we are interested in distinguishing only between worlds that differ in the
evaluation of some subformula of φ.
We now make this argument precise. Let Sub(φ) be the set of subformulas of
φ. We partition W into equivalence classes: For w ∈ W , define [w] = {w′ ∈ W :
∀ψ ∈ Sub(φ), (PL, w) |= ψ if and only if (PL, w′) |= ψ}. Thus, [w] contains all the
worlds that are indistinguishable, for the purpose of evaluating φ, from w. We
now choose, arbitrarily, a representative world wˆ ∈ [w] for each equivalence class.
These definitions extend to sets of worlds: For A ⊆ W , define [A] = ∪w∈A[w], and
Aˆ = {wˆ : w ∈ A}.
We construct PL′ as follows. We setW ′ = Wˆ . ClearlyW ′ is finite, since there are
only a finite number of subformulas of φ. Let π′ be the restriction of π toW ′, and let
P ′(wˆ)(W ′wˆ ,Pl
′
wˆ), where W
′
wˆ = Wˆwˆ, and Pl
′
wˆ is defined so that Pl
′
wˆ(A
′) ≤ Plwˆ(B
′)
if Plwˆ([A
′] ∩Wwˆ) ≤ Plwˆ([B′] ∩Wwˆ).
We need show that PL′ is a qualitative plausibility structure. This is easy to
prove since [·] preserves subsets, unions, and disjointness of sets: if A′ ⊆ B′, then
[A′] ⊆ [B′]; [A′ ∪B′] = [A′] ∪ [B′]; and [A′ ∩B′] = [A′] ∩ [B′].
Next, we need to show that if (PL, w) |= φ, then (PL′, wˆ) |= φ. In fact, we prove
this property for every subformula ψ of φ. The proof is by induction on the structure
of of ψ. The only case of interest is for conditional formulas ψ→ξ ∈ Sub(φ). This
case follows easily once we notice that if the induction hypothesis holds for ψ, then
[[[ψ]](PL′,wˆ)] ∩Wwˆ = [[ψ]](PL,wˆ) ∩Wwˆ .
Finally, we have to show that if PL is rational or normal, then so is PL′. Again,
this follows easily from the properties of [·].
Lemma A.10. Let (W,F ,Pl) be a rational and normal qualitative plausibility
space such that F is finite. Then there is a κ-ranking κ on W and a possibility
measure Poss on W such that for all disjoint A,B ∈ F , Pl(A) > Pl(B) if and only
if κ(A) < κ(B) and Pl(A) > Pl(B) if and only if Poss(A) > Poss(B).
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Proof. By Theorem 8.4, there is a ranked plausibility space (W,F ,Pl′) such
that Pl′ is default-equivalent to Pl. Since F is finite, the set {d : ∃A ∈ F ,Pl′(A) =
d} is finite. Moreover, since Pl′ is a ranking, this set is totally ordered. Let
d0 > d1 > . . . > dn be an ordered enumeration of this set of values.
Let κ be a κ-ranking such that κ(A) = k if Pl′(A) = dk > ⊥ and κ(A) = ∞ if
Pl′(A) = ⊥. Similarly, let Poss be a possibility measure such that Poss(A) = 1−k/n
if Pl′(A) = dk > ⊥ and Poss(A) = 0 if Pl
′(A) = ⊥. It easy to see that since Pl′
is a ranking, we get that κ(A ∪ B) = min(κ(A), κ(B)) and that Poss(A ∪ B) =
max(Poss(A),Poss(B)). It is also easy to see that both measures are equivalent to
Pl′ and thus default-equivalent to Pl.
Theorem 8.6. (a) C+{C6} is a sound and complete axiomatization of Sǫc .
(b) C +{C5, C6} is a sound and complete axiomatization of Sκc and S
Poss
c .
Proof. Part (a) is an immediate corollary of Theorems 6.3 and A.8.
For Part (b), as usual, it is easy to verify soundness. For completeness, it suffices
to show that if φ is consistent with system C+{C5,C6}, then it is satisfiable in Sκc
and SPossc . Suppose that φ is consistent with systemC+{C5,C6}. By Theorem A.8,
φ is satisfiable in a rational and normal structure in SQPLC . By Lemma A.9, we can
assume that this structure is finite. The result now follows from Lemma A.10.
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